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ABSTRACT
In recent years, occupational licensing boards have come under fire
from critics across the nation. Much of the recent critique of occupational
licensing boards has centered on the breadth of power these boards hold
and the supposed lack of state supervision over them. And yet, occupational
licensing boards in North Carolina are subject to significant state
supervision. This Article seeks to rebut arguments of no state supervision
over occupational licensing boards. This Article’s primary goal is to
provide a cogent defense of occupational licensing boards in an effort
to show their validity and legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
“No one has a right to practise . . . without having the necessary
qualifications of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that
whoever assumes, by offering to the community his services . . . that he
possesses such learning and skill . . . .”1

Occupational licensing is a form of government regulation that
requires a credential of some type, for instance a license, to engage in a
particular profession, occupation, or vocation for compensation. Therefore,
it becomes illegal to practice the given occupation without a license. The
“for compensation”—something of value—is a key component.
Statutes in most states, and the scholarly literature, most often describe
it as “occupational licensing,” but it is more accurate to describe it as
occupational and “professional” licensing. Professions in America are
generally those vocations that require advanced knowledge acquired by a
prolonged course of specialized intellectual study, including those requiring
a bachelor’s or advanced degree, such as doctors, nurses, attorneys,
engineers, architects, and landscape architects. Occupations are all the
others, including plumbers, electricians, barbers, cosmetologists, and
locksmiths. All of these, however, tend to be grouped under the single
descriptive term—”occupational licensing.”
Licensing is, and has been, under fire for the last decade. Licensing
advocates argue that it protects the public health, safety, and welfare (a legal
prerequisite), and keeps incompetent and unscrupulous individuals from
lawfully performing certain tasks. Denouncers, of which there are many,
claim that there is little effect on the overall quality of services provided, it
prohibits a certain segment of the possible workforce from earning higher
wages, and the methods employed to license individuals, especially where
a licensing board or commission is involved, smacks of a restraint of trade.
The opponents tend to focus much of their energies on the
“independent” boards and commissions, and it is there that I will focus my
defense. But mostly all forms of licensing are considered suspect by their
opponents.
Since 1957, North Carolina has shifted between a licensing scheme
administered by an independent board or commission and those that are not,
but there was always some question as to the true number. In 2019, the
legislature finally tried to distinguish between the two. To know the
difference goes a long way in understanding the opposition toward the
1. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (referring to medicine and
physicians).
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independent boards and commissions, and also to understanding a seminal
case from the United States Supreme Court that originated from North
Carolina but has had national implications.
A. What is Occupational Licensing?
A concise description of occupational licensing is found in the chapter
of the North Carolina’s statutes that defines an occupational licensing
board. Chapter 93B of the North Carolina General Statutes defines an
“occupational licensing board”:
[A]ny board, committee, commission, or other agency in North Carolina
which is established for the primary purpose of regulating the entry of
persons into, and/or the conduct of persons within, a particular profession
or occupation, and which is authorized to issue licenses; “occupational
licensing board” does not include State agencies, staffed by full-time State
employees, which as a part of their regular functions may issue licenses.2

This was the definition for sixty-two years, and every other form of
licensing, registration and certification was by any method other than by an
independent board. The defining factor was whether the board was staffed
by State employees.3 In 2019, the legislature amended section 93B-1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes and added a subsection (3) listing the
others, now called “[s]tate agency licensing boards.”4 A “license” is also
defined in the same section:
Any license (other than a privilege license), certificate, or other evidence of
qualification which an individual is required to obtain before he may engage

2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1 (2019) (emphasis added).
3. In practice this was not as pure as it appeared. Four boards and commissions, the
Criminal Justice Education and Training Commission, the Sheriffs’ Education and Training
Standards Commission, the Private Protective Services Board, and the Alarm Systems
Licensing Board, are staffed by state employees but were also considered—or treated as—
Occupational Licensing Boards (O.L.B.s).
4. An Act to Clarify and Simplify a Licensee’s Qualifications for Licensure and to
Require Recognition by Licensing Boards of Certain Apprenticeship and Training
Experiences, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 91, sec. 2. While it historically has been debatable, the
most accurate list of O.L.B.s is found in the Index to Title 21 of the North Carolina
Administrative Code. A close reading even shows that two, “House Movers” and “Water
Well Contractors,” were relocated since they did not meet the traditional definition. In my
opinion, the Cemetery Commission, Chapter 87, should be relocated since it does not license
individuals (i.e., “persons.”).
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in or represent himself to be a member of a particular profession or
occupation.5

While other forms of regulation exist, such as state certification (as
opposed to certification by some private organization or entity) and
registration, “license” is the generic term encompassing all forms and is the
term I use herein.
B. Misleading and Erroneous Comparisons
Commentators frequently compare licensing boards to the European
guild system or to unions. While the first has its similarities, it is a
misleading characterization, and the second—a comparison to unions—is
just plain erroneous.
The first guilds were organized by merchants in the cities and towns as early
as the twelfth century. They reflected the vocational framework of the
period and were an early outgrowth of the revival of trade after the so-called
Dark Ages. Their basic purpose was to protect the economic interests of
their members, though they also served as a means of providing some
protection against economic and trade practices which would be harmful to
the community. The guilds received legal recognition by municipal
authorities including the right to restrict membership and to regulate trade
among various communities.
The merchant guilds tended to become quite exclusive bodies, the members
of which enjoyed considerable wealth and social prestige. Naturally they
guarded their privileged status by carefully limiting their membership and
by refusing to admit persons from different segments of the economy. The
result was the formation of new types of guilds consisting of free artisans
who practiced the several crafts which developed or were revived during
this period.
The new guilds were organized along craft lines and like the earlier groups
had as their major purposes the protection of the economic interests of their
members. They instituted a system of self-regulation, governing prices,
wages, hours, working conditions and other aspects of [trade].6

Occupational licensing boards are not the reincarnation of the guild
systems, as some would have you believe, but some current licensing
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1.
6. William L. Frederick, The History and Philosophy of Occupational Licensing
Legislation in the United States, 58 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 18, 18–19 (Mar. 1959) (indicating
Frederick was the Eastern Representative of the Council of State Governments).
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practices serve some of the same purposes such as ensuring only competent
persons are allowed to enter the vocation or trade.
There are no accurate similarities to a union. A labor union in the
United States is an organization that represents workers in many industries
recognized under United States labor laws. Their activity in modern times
centers on collective bargaining over wages, benefits, and working
conditions for their members, and on representing their members in disputes
with management over violations of contract provisions.7 A state
occupational licensing entity, be it a board, commission, or a state agency,
does none of that—zero. In fact, these licensing entities are prohibited by
federal (and sometimes state) law from doing so.
While there are some similarities between the British “trade unions,”
which are more likened to the ancient guilds, calling occupational licensing
“unionism” is merely cheap dog-whistling to cast dispersion on an
otherwise beneficial process.
C. A Few Words about “Title Acts”
The “licensing” of an individual to engage in a vocation or occupation
comes in degrees. By that I mean it starts with the most rigorous, which is
licensing, and descends through “registration,” then “certification.” Within
that there is a variation. These are known as “title acts”; an individual
cannot use a specific title without having met the qualifications established
by the legislature and administered by a board or commission or state
agency. The most familiar are “M.D.,” “D.D.S.,” “R.N.,” and “D.V.M.” for
“Medical Doctor,” “Doctor of Dental Surgery,” “Registered Nurse,” and
“Doctor of Veterinary Medicine,” respectively. But there are many others:
“C.P.A.” for Certified Public Accountant and “P.E.” for Professional
Engineer, for instance. You can be an accountant or an engineer, but you
cannot use the particular designator, or “title,” without authorization from
the respective board. Many previous title acts slowly morphed over the
years into full-blown licensing acts.8

7. Most unions in the United States are aligned with one of two larger umbrella
organizations: the AFL-CIO, created in 1955, and the Change to Win Federation which split
from the AFL-CIO in 2005. Both advocate for policies and legislation on behalf of workers
in the United States and Canada and are very active politically.
8. One example is landscape architects in North Carolina. Once a registration and title
act, section 89A of the North Carolina General Statutes became a full-blown licensing law
in 1979. However, licensed landscape architects still use the designator “R.L.A.” for
Registered Landscape Architects. It is worth noting that some authors and commentators
erroneously define “certification” as merely a process that allows for the exclusive use of a
title. Such is not the case.
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D. “Public health, safety, and welfare” and the United States Supreme
Court
While often lost on some, the most critical aspect of the licensing,
registration, or certification of any profession or occupation is centered on
a catchphrase few attorneys think about when they read it: the protection of
the “public health, safety, and welfare.” Yes, you read that phrase often,
but why?
“The right to practice a recognized profession is not an absolute or
unqualified right.”9 That right is subject to the police power of the state.
Due to the limits of federalism, plus the recognition of the state as sovereign,
that police power is within the exclusive province of the state. The state’s
interest, of course, is the protection of the public. Consequently, as the case
law has evolved, the state controls the various aspects of professional
practice including among other things, admission to practice, standards of
practice, continuing competency, removal from practice, and readmission
to practice.
Scholarly journals and case law have thoroughly documented the
authority of states to regulate the admission to the practice of professions.
The landmark Supreme Court decision discussing that authority is Dent v.
West Virginia, 10 which I quoted in the introduction. In Dent, the newly
created West Virginia State Board of Health was granted authority to license
physicians and surgeons who were graduates of a reputable medical college,
who had been in practice for the ten years preceding the passage of the act,
or who had passed the board’s examination.11 Dent was denied a license
because his diploma was not from a reputable college of medicine in the
opinion of the state board, nor had he met the other admission
requirements.12 Dent was tried before a jury on a criminal charge of
practicing medicine without a license and fined $50.00 and court costs.13
He appealed, and the case ultimately reached the United States Supreme
Court. Justice Field, writing in Dent, said the following:
As one means to this end it has been the practice of different States, from
time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and
learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession
9. DIANE KJERVIK AND EDITH ANN BROUS, LAW AND ETHICS IN ADVANCED PRACTICE
NURSING 149 (2010) (attributing this quotation to Gloria Damgaard, former director of the
South Dakota Board of Nursing).
10. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889).
11. Id. at 115.
12. Id. at 117.
13. Id. at 118.
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being generally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent
persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or
license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects,
scientific and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. The nature
and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the
judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the
calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no
objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or
difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling or
profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application,
that they can operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful
vocation.14

This was 1898, and such challenges are still forthcoming.
Since the time of Dent, the evolution of the law in the federal and state
courts can be most simply summarized this way: A state cannot regulate
entry into an occupation or profession unless it can be shown that the
regulation of the occupation or profession is to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare. This is rooted in the rational relation test, the lowest
tier of three standards established by the United States Supreme Court, to
determine the permissiveness of a state action that allegedly infringes on a
constitutional right.15
Midway through the last century, courts were already discerning the
breadth of Dent and expanding its scope beyond the health professions. As
stated by the Ninth Circuit in a California case challenging the state’s
statutes governing professional engineers,
The principles stated in the Dent case have been widely applied by all the
states in a great variety of professions and businesses, including
engineering. We think that there can be no question of the power of the
State of California to regulate the business of engineering, both mechanical

14. Id. at 122.
15. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych.,
228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (referencing psychologists); Potts v. Ill. Dep’t. of
Registration & Educ., 538 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Ill. 1989); Maguire v. Thompson, 957 F.2d
374, 376 (7th Cir. 1992) (referencing naprapathy); Feingold v. Commonwealth, 568 A.2d
1365, 1368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (referencing naturopaths); Williams v. State ex rel. Med.
Licensure Comm’n, 453 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); People v. Rosburg, 805
P.2d 432, 437 (Colo. 1991) (referencing midwifery); Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
66 F.3d 639, 644–45 (3d Cir. 1995) (referencing midwifery); Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of
Educ. of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1997) (referencing midwifery); Smith v.
California, 336 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1964) (referencing engineers). This is a mere
representative list and is by no means exhaustive.
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and electrical, for the protection of the public, and that the means that the
state has used do not on their face violate any provision of the federal
constitution. In this regard the complaint does not present a substantial
federal question.16

It is the “public health, safety, and welfare” concept that is so essential.
In reading many of the enabling acts for the licensure of any occupation or
profession in North Carolina, there will be a preamble section of the statute
making a declaration of legislative intent based on this concept.17 And it
was the inability to substantiate this concept that resulted in the repeal or
sunset of three occupations: photographers,18 watchmakers,19 and tile
contractors.20
While I am most certain this observation will bring cries of protest
from the industry, it was not until the worst draught conditions ever faced
by our state that irrigation contractors were successful at becoming a
licensed occupation after numerous previous attempts.21 They could finally
show protection of the public health, safety, and welfare.

16. Smith, 336 F.2d at 534 (citation omitted).
17. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-98.3 (2019) (well contractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
88A-2 (2019) (electrologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89A-1(3) (2019) (landscape architects )
(this section does not include a preamble, but does include a definition of profession and
standards for continuing education in 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 26.0308(c) (2020)); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 89B-1(b) (2019) (foresters); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-2 (2019) (engineers & land
surveyors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89E-2 (2019) (geologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89F-2 (2019)
(soil scientists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2(a) (2019) (establishing a “Medical Board to regulate
the practice of medicine and surgery for the benefit and protection of the people of North
Carolina”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(a) (2019) (dentists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.2 (2019)
(pharmacists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.30 (2019) (substance use disorder professionals).
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 92 (2019), invalidated by State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731
(1949).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 93C (2019), repealed by Act to Establish a System for the
Periodic Review and for theTermination, Continuation, or Reestablishment of Certain
Licensing and Regulatory Agencies, ch. 712, sec. 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 901 (1977).
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-28 to -38 (2019), repealed by Act to Establish a System
for the Periodic Review and for the Termination, Continuation, or Reestablishment of
Certain Licensing and Regulatory Agencies, ch. 712, sec. 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 901
(1977).
21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89G (2019). Prior to passage of S.L. 2008-177, there had
been two attempts to obtain passage of a licensure law in 2001 (H.B. 984, 2001 Leg., 145th
Sess. (N.C. 2001)) under the existing Landscape Contractors, and in 2003 (H.B. 947, 2003
Leg., 145th Sess. (N.C. 2003)); and inclusion in 2004’s Study Act (Act Concerning Studies
and Other Purposes, ch. 161, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 546 (2004)).
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I. LICENSING STATUES AND ENABLING ACTS
While reviewing the scholarly literature espousing elimination, or at a
minimum “reform” of occupational licensing, much of the focus is on the
boards and commissions made up of appointed members (now, the section
93B-1(3) of the North Carolina General Statute boards). These are the
so-called “independent licensing boards.” There is little distinction, short
of funding source and staffing; however, there are numerous other state
agencies that issue some type of license, registration, certification or permit
that allows a person (or business) to engage in a profession or occupation
or some other means of making a living.22 The independent boards make
an easier target, however, for claims of protectionism, self-dealing, and
restraint of trade. Albeit, as argued below, such is not the case in reality.
A. License and regulate.
One of the major points missed by detractors is that the purpose of the
entity—be it a board, commission, or state agency—is not just to license, it
is to “regulate.” It is to regulate the minimum qualifications to practice the
vocation, whether through a certain experience, education, or a combination
of the two. It is to determine the moral and ethical standards that are to be
considered, typically evidenced by a lack of a criminal record, but financial
ability or stability is often considered. Then, once licensed, the licensee is
held to standards: community standards as to practice and job performance;
professional standards through a code of conduct or ethical standards; and
a general policing of behavior that demonstrates an unfitness to remain a
licensed member entitled to practice the vocation. And finally, for many
occupations and professions, the licensee must maintain competence by
way of required continuing education.
These requirements are nothing more than the sovereign state
exercising its constitutionally protected police powers to provide for the
general safety and welfare of its citizens as determined by those citizens’
elected representatives. How can any group, be it Republican, Democrat,
Independent, “Tea Party,” Libertarian, or by whatever label, be opposed to
a method of regulation chosen by the people?

22. See, e.g., the numerous board and commissions set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
93B-1(3) (2019), the “State agency licensing boards.”
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B. Basic Scheme for an Occupational Licensing Board
For North Carolina, as well as the vast majority of other jurisdictions
around the nation, the statutory scheme for licensing follows a typical
structure:
 A “preamble” or “purpose” section stating the need for
regulation to protect the public health, safety, and welfare;23
 Definitions, especially of the scope of the regulated
occupation or profession;24
 The establishment of the board or commission, including the
number of members, the appointment (or recommending for
appointment) authority, removal and vacancies, officers and
meetings, and compensation;25
 Powers and duties of the board or commission including the
obvious, such as administer and enforce the provisions of the
enabling statute, adopt, amend and repeal administrative rules,
and examine and determine qualifications. Also often
included is the power to hire employees, fix compensation,
and maintain records;26
 Qualifications, examinations, application, and issuance;27
 Reciprocity and/or comity;28
 Renewal;29
 Exemptions;30
 Fees;31 and
 Acts or conduct that can result in application denial or
revocation, suspension or some other disciple of a license.32

23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-21 (2019).
24. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-22 (2019).
25. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-23 (2019).
26. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-24 (2019).
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-27 (2019).
28. There is a difference. “Reciprocity” exists where one jurisdiction recognizes the
license of another, typically with some caveat such as the standards of the boards of the other
jurisdictions are “substantially equivalent to or higher than” the granting state. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90C-33 (2019). “Comity,” on the other hand, is where a jurisdiction accepts or
recognizes the person based solely upon the person having a license in that jurisdiction,
typically with the requirement the person has practiced the vocation for a specific amount of
time. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89F-12 (2019).
29. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-29 (2019).
30. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-34 (2019).
31. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-28 (2019).
32. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-32 (2019).
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There are a few other common provisions, such as statutes that require
an annual report to the Governor, legislature, or Secretary of State (that
likely pre-date the myriad of reports required elsewhere),33 grant
independent boards and commissions the ability to own real property,34 and
provide a number of boards with a recovery fund to compensate the public
when financially injured by the conduct of a licensee.35
II. THE ANTI-LICENSING ARGUMENT
A. The opponents
“Onerous, arbitrary, unaccountable,”36 “protection racket,”37
“monopolistic,”38 restraints of trade,39 “medieval guild[s],”40 economic

33. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-2 (2019); see discussion infra Section VI. B.
34. See infra note 170.
35. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-3.1(c) (2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the
Auctioneers Commission to the Commission’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-9.1(a) (2019)
(limiting collateral pledged by the Board of General Contractors to the Board’s assets); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 87-18 (2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the Board of Plumbing, Heating,
and Fire Sprinkler Contractors to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-42 (2019)
(limiting collateral pledged by the Board of Electrical Contractors to the Board’s assets);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-63.1(a) (2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the Board of
Refrigeration Contractors to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-10(i) (2019)
(limiting collateral pledged by the Board of Engineering & Land Surveying to the Board’s
assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.11A(a) (2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the Board of
Pharmacy to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.23(h1) (2019) (limiting collateral
pledged by the Board of Funeral Service to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-270.92(13) (2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the Board of Physical Therapy
Examiners to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12(17) (2019) (limiting collateral
pledged by the Board of CPA Examiners to the Board’s assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-3(f)
(2019) (limiting collateral pledged by the Real Estate Commission to the Commission’s
assets).
36. Michelle Cottle, The Onerous, Arbitrary, Unaccountable World of Occupational
Licensing, ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08
/trump-obama-occupational-licensing/536619/ [https://perma.cc/JY27-BDA6].
37. Mark Flatten, Protection Racket: Occupational Licensing Laws and the Right to
Earn a Living, GOLDWATER INST. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/protec
tion-racket-occupational-licensing-laws-and/ [https://perma.cc/DN4D-UM7L].
38. Id. (quoting STAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION, infra note 50); Robert Everett
Johnson, Boards Behaving Badly, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 2015), https://ij.org/report/boardsbehaving-badly/ [https://perma.cc/JG9Y-ND7R].
39. See Johnson, supra note 38.
40. Robert Thornton, Who Benefits Most from Occupational Licensing?, LEHIGH UNIV.
(Apr. 27, 2018) https://business.lehigh.edu/blog/2018/who-benefits-most-occupational-lice
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protectionism,41 and unions;42 these are just a few of the descriptions of
occupational licensing, and particularly of the independent boards, used by
writers and commentators.43
The advocates for change, reform, or out-right elimination come from
a number of sides: the libertarian law firm Institute for Justice,44 the
Goldwater Institute,45 the Mercatus Institute at George Mason University,46
the Brookings Institute,47 and the John Locke Foundation and its North
Carolina publication “The Carolina Journal.”48 Their efforts have dated
back over a decade. Even the White House got involved and released a
seventy-six-page report in 2015 prepared jointly by the Department of
Treasury Office of Economic Policy, the Council of Economic Advisors,
and the Department of Labor: “Occupational Licensing: A Framework for
Policy Makers.”49 While this push began as a libertarian issue, it has
nsing [https://perma.cc/DV3Q-397S] (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 141 (1962)).
41. See Ryan Nunn, How Occupational Licensing Matters for Wages and Careers,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-occupational-licensi
ng-matters-for-wages-and-careers/ [https://perma.cc/TE6P-Y6NB]; accord Rebecca H.
Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards up Close, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 1567, 1592 (2017).
42. Cf. Johnson, supra note 38 (alluding to the union-like behavior of occupational
licensing boards by explaining that “[i]n Dental Examiners, a dental board composed of
practicing dentists sought to exclude non-dentist teeth whiteners from the market, not
because the teeth whiteners posed a danger to consumers (they did not), but rather because
they threatened dentists’ lucrative monopoly on teeth whitening services”).
43. One North Carolina legislator even referred to our occupational licensing boards
collectively as “cartels” in a committee meeting while debating the PED report.
44. See generally INST. FOR JUST., https://www.ij.org/ [https://perma.cc/V25W-CDEL]
(this website is fraught with juicy tales of overreach, and its track record for litigation—
which is impressive—indicates a tendency to pursue only the most absurd examples so as to
garner media coverage, such as casket-making monks and African hair braiders).
45. See generally GOLDWATER INST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org [https://perma.cc/2B
T7-EAK9].
46. See generally MERCATUS, https://www.mercatus.org [https://perma.cc/H2V5MKAK].
47. See generally BROOKINGS, https://brookings.edu [https://perma.cc/2BT7-EAK9].
48. See generally CAROLINA J., https://www.carolinajournal.com/ [https://perma.cc/UJ5
G-8Y4R]. See also AMS. FOR PROSPERITY, http://www.americansforprosperity.org [https://p
erma.cc/7Z6E-VQKA]; AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNS., http://www.alec.org [https://perma.cc/D
5F8-BZP6].
49. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECONOMIC POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, &
DEP’T OF LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY MAKERS (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_none
mbargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TDH-FFQD]. Interestingly, while many commentators have
opined that former President Donald Trump’s only discernable policy initiative was to undo
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morphed into a philosophical one, with Republicans and Democrats joining
the cause.
The anti-licensing movement is reflected not only in the scholarly
reports of the entities mentioned above, but in hundreds of articles in
business journals; magazines devoted to business, economics, and
sociology; the American Bar Association’s ABA Journal; and online news
sources devoted to politics, such as The Hill. There are too many to list.
But were you to read them all, it would not take you long to realize that
it is an echo chamber. The calls for repeal of licensing laws—claiming they
block competition; create a privileged class within the workforce; create a
wage advantage, labor market inequality, wage inequality, or wage
premium; allow “rents” to accrue to a licensee; suppress innovation; prevent
job migration; create a guild system; allow for state-sanctioned unions; and
a host of other unimaginable ills—all trace their roots back to the research
and reports of one academic: Morris M. Kleiner of Michigan State
University. Kleiner, alone and in concert with other respected academics,
has studied and written about the economic impacts of occupational
licensing not only in the United States, but also in foreign countries
including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 50
everything former President Barack Obama set in place, one area the two agreed on—and a
policy Trump embraced—was “fixing” occupational licensing. Within months of his
appointment, new Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta called on state lawmakers to repeal
licensing laws. See Eric Boehm, Trump’s Labor Secretary Tells State Lawmakers: ‘Fix
Occupational Licensing,’ REASON (July 24, 2017, 11:16 AM), https://reason.com/2017/07/2
4/trumps-labor-secretary-tells-state-lawma/ [https://perma.cc/Q3JQ-7XBF].
50. See generally MORRIS M. KLEINER, STAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION:
ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES (2013), https://research.upjohn.org/up_press/222/
[https://perma.cc/ZG5V-PUEF]; MORRIS M. KLEINER, GUILD-RIDDEN LABOR MARKETS:
THE CURIOUS CASE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING (2015), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/vie
wcontent.cgi?article=1254&context=up_press [https://perma.cc/D4Q8-PM2P]; Morris M.
Kleiner, The Influence of Occupational Licensing and Regulation, IZA WORLD OF LAB., Oct.
2017, at 1; Amy Humphris et al., How Does Government Regulate Occupations in the United
Kingdom and United States? Issues and Policy Implications, in EMPLOYMENT IN THE LEAN
YEARS: POLICY AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT DECADE 87 (David Marsden ed., 2011);
MARIA KOUMENTA ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION IN THE EU AND UK: PREVALENCE
AND LABOUR MARKET IMPACTS (2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/343554/bis-14-999-occupational-regulationin-the-EU-and-UK.pdf; Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing
Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59 J. OF L. & ECON. 261
(2016); Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational
Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 676 (2010); Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger,
Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J.
LAB. ECON. S173 (2013); Maury Gittleman & Morris M. Kleiner, Wage Effects of
Unionization and Occupational Licensing Coverage in the United States, 69 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 142 (2016); MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY
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To quote a reviewer of his research, “As do all econometric studies,
Kleiner’s end up as essays in persuasion.”51
Albeit, as large as Kleiner’s body of work may be—and the even larger
body of commentaries parroting his work in support of one or more
contentions—the basic premise of those opposed to the licensing52 of
occupations and professions can be summarized in a few theories: economic
damage; consumer protectionism; health, safety, and welfare; and disparity
between states.
The economic damage argument essentially states that a wage
inequality exists between licensed and unlicensed individuals, which causes
an increase in the cost of goods and services from licensed individuals.53
The consumer protectionism argument is nothing more than an antitrust
argument—that licensing lessens competition and restrains free trade.54
The health, safety, and welfare argument takes consumer protectionism one
step further to say that the repeal of licensing boards will actually further
society’s health, safety, and welfare.55 An argument predicated on the
disparity between states in regulating certain industries points to the
difficulty in interstate migration for licensed individuals.56 While Kleiner’s
works have evolved over time, and others have riffed off of his research
with theories of their own, these are the foundational arguments used to
oppose a licensing scheme.
Because many have relied on Kleiner as their foundational base, a few
interesting observations have presented themselves consistently throughout.

RESTRICTING COMPETITION?” (2006), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1034&context=up_press [https://perma.cc/CS3R-LYQP]; Morris M. Kleiner &
Robert T. Kudrel, Does Regulation Affect Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry. 43
J.L. & ECON. 2 (2000); Morris M. Kleiner et al., Barriers to Labor Migration: The Case of
Occupational Licensing, 21 INDUS. REL. 383 (1982).
51. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Does Occupational Licensing Deserve our Approval? A Review
of Work by Morris Kleiner, 11 ECON. J. WATCH 318, 322 (2014).
52. Included within the general premise of occupational licensing reform or elimination
are its various forms, which range from total elimination of all licensing, to licensing only
those professions that require advanced knowledge or skill (e.g., doctors, nurses, attorneys,
engineers, surveyors, etc.), registration of only certain occupations and professions,
certification of only certain occupations and professions, and a system where only private
entities certify (such as exists with the alphabet soup of designations that follow the name
on the business card of your apartment manager or financial planner).
53. See sources cited supra note 50.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
OR
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First, much of the initial data used is now stale.57 Second, aside from hard
numbers, many of the articles rely on pure speculation. But the one truly
interesting aspect of the whole, mostly one-sided debate, is the
contradictory positions taken by those who have chosen to tackle this topic
by way of advocating for reform or elimination.58
B. Debunking the data/statistics
Until recently, it appears little had been done by the “pro-licensing”
crowd to counter these attacks.59 However, there is only a smattering of
research available. Most notable is a 2017 examination of occupational
licensing that contradicts the decades old research. It found that
professional licensing does not limit competition, nor does it increase
wages.60
Authored by Beth Redbird, Assistant Professor of Sociology in the
Weinberg Western College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern
University, the study was based on a new occupational dataset covering
thirty years, thereby contradicting decades old research on the impact of
occupational licensing. This is the most comprehensive examination of
licensing to date. The study relied on more than 4.5 million workers across
500 occupations.61
“The most substantial growth” of vocation licensure over the past
thirty years has been in so-called “blue-collar occupations, and particularly
the production and transportation sector, which more than doubled its
licensed workforce.”62
Redbird argues that instead of increased wages, licensure creates a set
of institutional mechanisms that enhance entry into the occupation,

57. Much of the statistical data relied upon and quoted in Kleiner’s various articles date
to the mid-1980s. See id.
58. I am no authority on “isms” and have struggled while studying religions of the world
to understand the tenants of Hinduism and Buddhism, but I do have a political scientist’s
understanding of the philosophical positions that are espoused in the political realm. So,
everyone should make the same amount of money irrespective of skill or ability? And that
is being championed by avowed libertarian think-tanks? Is that not what we call
“socialism”? Along that same line, every state should govern its people in the exact same
manner as every other, a position being proffered by the likes of the John Locke Foundation?
Are they not the voice of the federalists? This all seems a bit contradictory.
59. The rise of the pro-licensing advocates, such as ARPL, is discussed below. See
discussion infra VII.B.
60. Beth Redbird, The New Closed Shop? The Economic and Structural Effects of
Occupational Licensure, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 600, 610–18 (2017).
61. Id. at 607–09.
62. Id. at 600.
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particularly for historically disadvantaged groups, while simultaneously
stagnating quality. Her study is different from previous examinations of the
topic in that it relies on two important research innovations. First, it tracks
licensing legislation across all fifty states through an exhaustive search of
statutes and administrative codes. For example, licensed cosmetologists in
one state are compared to unlicensed cosmetologists in another within the
same year, then licensed occupational therapists are compared to unlicensed
occupational therapists, and so on. Second, for the first time, the effect of
licensing has been studied over time. Utilizing a longitudinal approach,
Redbird’s study examines wages in the year following enactment of a
licensing statute and evaluates exactly how they change when a law is
passed.
Redbird’s study finds the opposite of those conducted by Kleiner and
others: the typical weekly wage declines by between 0.19% and 1.23% due
to licensure.63 Additionally, the results of the study show that after
licensing, the number of workers in the occupation increased by an average
of more than 7% over original levels.64
In an article in ScienceDaily, Redbird was quick to acknowledge that
“the research could have implications for changing how workers enter an
occupation,” recognizing that through licensure, regulations “can define the
‘proper’ way to practice, since license requirements are essentially
comprehensive lists of ways to [enter a profession, then] be excluded or
removed.”65
A very recent study, commissioned by the Alliance for Responsible
Professional Licensing, further adds to the discussion and debate about the
benefits of occupational and professional licensing.66 Produced by Oxford
Economics, the study is a first-of-its-kinds quantitative research study
which explores the impacts of professional licensing in highly complex,
technical fields.

63. Id. at 611.
64. Id. at 613.
65. Hilary Hurd Anyaso, New Examination of Occupational Licensing Contradicts
Decades of Research, SCIENCEDAILY (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com
/releases/2017/10/171017153004.htm [https://perma.cc/P233-VSKX]. In doing so, Redbird
also noted that licensure can “limit innovation, reduce experimentation and perhaps hinder
growth in knowledge,” an acknowledgment of the fact that “practitioners in unlicensed
markets are free to compete on all aspects of their occupations, [while] licensed workers
must obey legal limitations on both what they do and how they do it.” Id.
66. OXFORD ECON., VALUING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING IN THE US: A REPORT FOR THE
ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE PROFESSIONAL LICENSING (2021) http://www.responsiblelicensi
ng.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ARPL_Jan2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KN-NKCN]
[hereinafter VALUING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING IN THE US].

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2021

17

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 6

440

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:423

Released in January 2021 and entitled, “Valuing Professional
Licensing in the US,” the study centered around two hypotheses: (1) the
impact of licensing varies by the skill level required to perform a particular
occupation or profession, and (2) the impact of licensing varies by gender
and race.67
The study used a three-step approach. First, it reviewed the empirical
literature, including the works of Professors Morris M. Kleiner and Beth
Redbird.68 Next, it constructed an individual-level database, combining
license status and salary data with a range of demographic characteristics
such as gender, age, and educational attainment.69 Then, it developed
econometric models70 to better understand the relationship between salaries
and licensing, accounting for other socio-economic factors.71
As noted in Section II.A. above, prior research arrived at generalized
conclusions about the monetary and societal impacts of licensing. The
Oxford Economics study, however, takes a more in-depth analysis of the
available data, revealing nuanced findings about the effects of licensing
while also pointing out the deficiencies of prior research’s reliance on
“pooled data” from all licensed professions and occupations, which only
resulted in generalized conclusions across the licensing spectrum.72 Those
deficiencies fostered the notion that a weakening or elimination of licensing
across all professions and occupations would well serve all professionals
and the public.73 The Oxford Economics study sees that conclusion as an
empirical problem; that the conclusion is flawed because such “pooled”
research methodology does not account for important distinctions that exist
across various professions and occupations.74
One of the study’s most interesting findings is that the value of
licensing is especially significant for those engaged in the trades or

67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 9–10.
69. Id. at 11–16.
70. An “econometric model” is a tool economists use in analyzing past economic
relationships to forecast future developments within a particular economic phenomenon.
Saul H. Hymans, Forecasting and Econometric Models, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ForecastingandEconometricModels.html [https://perm
a.cc/V47Q-HTAL].
71. Alice Gambarin, Senior Economist for Oxford Econ., & Elizabeth Hebron, Dir. of
State Gov’t Affs. for the Am. Soc’y of Landscape Architects, Webinar for Council of
Landscape Architectural Boards (Feb. 4, 2021).
72. Id.; VALUING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING IN THE US, supra note 66, at 18–19, 33.
73. VALUING PROFESSIONAL LICENSING IN THE US, supra note 66, at 33.
74. Id. This has also been my own experience, and one that I hope is reflected in the
views I have express in this Article.
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vocational occupations.75 For instance, the study revealed that licensing
provides a pathway to higher earnings: A barber can expect a 7.1% wage
increase after licensure, while an architect can expect a 3.6% increase after
becoming licensed.76
Another pertinent result of the study was evidence that licensing
actually narrows the wage gap for women and racial minorities in highly
complex, technical fields. A license narrows the gender-driven wage gap
by about a third and the race-driven wage gap by about half in those fields.77
Female engineers, surveyors, architects, landscape architects, and CPAs can
expect, on average, a 6.1% hourly wage increase after becoming licensed
compared to a 0.7% increase for their male counterparts.78 Minority
professionals in these same highly complex, technical fields can expect an
8.1% hourly wage increase on average; their white counterparts can only
expect a 2.9% increase after licensure.79
One major emphasis of the study is that licensing effects professions
and occupations differently, and licensing systems should reflect those
differences. These differences suggest that solving any occupation-specific
licensing challenges should not be approached with a “one-size-fits-all”
view.80 Before taking any action a governor or legislature should consider
differences in skill requirements, especially in lower-skill vocations.
Further, policy makers should be cognitive of unintended
consequences of a blanket approach. The Oxford Economics study tends to
show licensing substantially supports women and minorities moving toward
wage parity (but more so for highly skilled workers).81 In the current
political climate these two factors have strong public policy implications
and reflect another positive benefit of occupational and professional
licensing.
C. Anti-licensing and the truth about State Dental Board of Examiners v.
FTC
Since my first days in the North Carolina Attorney General’s Office in
the mid-1980s, I heard from the attorneys in the Consumer Protection
Section that the independent occupational and professional licensing boards
in this state are “restraints of trade” and a violation of various antitrust acts,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 33–36.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 33, 37.
Id. at 37.
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both state and federal. Despite that, there were no reported cases
establishing that fact. The claim had, and has, been made ad nauseum in
studies, reports, and articles, without a single example of misconduct by a
board or proof that any occupational licensing board has ever intentionally
sought to exclude persons from an occupation or profession that was not
otherwise qualified.82 It had always been mere speculation—conspiracy
theory at its finest.
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, however,
breathed life into the conspiracy theorists and gave them the real-life
example for which they had been longing. After years of unsubstantiated
claims of anticompetitive restrictions created by licensing, particularly by
occupational licensing boards, the opponents of occupational and
professional licensing were given an appellate court case they could point
to as proof.
That case was the United States Supreme Court’s February 25, 2015,
opinion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC.83 For
this very narrow practice area of administrative law, the case caused an
uproar as boards and commission members, their executive or
administrative officers, and especially their attorneys worked to understand
the impact of the case. For two years, every national association of licensing
professionals where the regulatory act was performed by a board or
commission comprised of licensees and non-licensee citizens heard about
the case. States, as well as the United States Congress, introduced

82. In truth—and in my experience as a practitioner and attorney for numerous
receipt-supported, independent licensing boards—the opposite is true. I address that fact
below.
83. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015).
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legislation to address the issues raised by Dental Examiners. 84 The
opponents beat the drum even louder for reform and continue to do so.85
For all the wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth, Dental Examiners
is not a complicated case to understand,86 but the opponents of licensing
have used the case as a pretext for other arguments. It is not that they do
not understand the case: it is intentional to achieve the goals of the
anti-regulatory movement. And their voice is loud.
The legal basis of Dental Examiners is simple and merely addresses
the scope of immunity from federal antitrust law. A state may engage in
conduct that would otherwise be monopolistic and anti-competitive if its
purpose is for regulating conduct for the good of its citizens. Immunity is
afforded to the state through what is known as the “Parker immunity
doctrine,” which was established by the Court in Parker v. Brown.87 Parker
is rooted in the bed-rock tenants of state sovereignty and held that actions
by a state government acting in its sovereign capacity did not violate
antitrust laws.
84. There is a cached document available with a list compiled in 2016 by the National
Conference of State Legislatures, How is Your State Dealing with NC Dental?, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislativestaff/research-editorial-legal-and-committee-staff/dealing-with-nc-dental.aspx [https://perm
a.cc/5HS3-E3V2]. An updated list and statute will require a state-by-state search.
Interestingly, North Carolina, the home state of Dental Examiners, introduced a bill in 2016,
House Bill 1007, to address the concerns expressed by the Court’s majority, but then this bill
was used as the vehicle to repeal House Bill 2, a controversial bill regarding public restrooms
aimed at transgender persons. No attempt has been made since to bring North Carolina into
compliance with this case, arguably a sign that some such adjustments need not be made in
the eyes of our General Assembly. Albeit numerous bills have been introduced to otherwise
“reform” occupational licensing in N.C., far too many to attempt to list them herein. On the
federal level, a number of acts have been introduced to restore these licensing boards’
protection. See infra note 227.
85. Johnson, supra note 38 (“The bad behavior has been going on for
decades . . . . States . . . should seek to restrict the kind of underlying conduct that gets
boards into trouble in the first place.”)
86. Albeit, as is typical in Supreme Court opinions, not everything was resolved by this
single case. Cases are percolating in the federal district courts and federal appellate courts.
See Jeffrey P. Gray, DB II: Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Go Back in the Water,
NCBARBLOG (Sept. 18, 2020), https://ncbarblog.com/al-db-ii-just-when-you-thought-itwas-safe-to-go-back-in-the-water/ [https://perma.cc/GCP8-TBY7].
87. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The rationale behind Parker immunity is
that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Antitrust Act’s prohibitions of anticompetitive
actions and promotion of market efficiencies, was not intending the Act to apply to actions
by a state. Parker originated from a New Deal raisin cartel created by the State of California.
When state houses nationwide happily delegated Parker immunity to trade associations in
the ensuing years, and groups, including attorneys, began using this delegation to set a price
floor, the Court began reining in Parker. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 96.
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North Carolina’s legislature designated the North Carolina State Board
of Dental Examiners to be “the agency of the State for the regulation of the
practice of dentistry”88 and required that six of the eight members of the
Board be licensed, practicing dentists. Acting upon complaints by dentists,
the Board issued cease-and-desist orders to non-dentists offering tooth
whitening services and to teeth whitening product manufacturers, often
warning that practicing without a license for dentistry is a crime. These
orders prompted many non-dentists to stop offering these services in North
Carolina.
On June 17, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission filed an
administrative complaint alleging that the Dental Board’s actions were
anti-competitive and unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act.89
The Board moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Board
was covered under the state-action immunity doctrine. The administrative
law judge (ALJ) refused to dismiss the complaint and later ruled that the
Board’s concerted action was an unreasonable restraint of trade and a
method of unfair competition, which ran afoul of antitrust law.90 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s
decision,91 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Oral
arguments were held on October 14, 2014.92
In a 6–3 decision, the Court ruled that a state licensing board that is
composed primarily of active market participants has state action immunity
from antitrust law only when that board is actively supervised by the state.93
Justice Anthony Kennedy started the majority opinion by extolling the
Sherman Antitrust Act as “a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market
structures,” but then noted that the states’ power to regulate would be
“impermissib[ly] burden[ed]” if states had to obey United States antitrust
law.94 Kennedy then discussed Parker at length.95 He reasoned that “[s]tate
agencies [were] not simply by their governmental character sovereign
actors for purposes of state-action immunity,” and that immunity for these
88. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 494 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 501. It is worthy to note that the FTC technically does not have the authority
to enforce the Sherman Antitrust Act; this authority is vested in the Attorney General. 15
U.S.C. § 9 (2018). Albeit, the United States Supreme Court has routinely held that all
violations of the Sherman Act violate the FTC Act. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of
Am. Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
90. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 501–02.
91. Id. at 502.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id. at 497, 504.
94. Id. at 502–03.
95. Id. at 503.
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agencies required “more than a mere facade of state involvement.”96
Because the Sherman Act was designed to break private monopolies, Justice
Kennedy did not accept that “congressional judgment” was to allow the
states to grant “unsupervised control to active market participants.”97
After California delegated price fixing authority directly to wine
merchants, the Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. began limiting immunity to where “the State ha[d]
articulated a clear . . . [anticompetitive] policy” and “the State provides
active supervision of the anticompetitive conduct.”98 North Carolina did
not claim it had set any anticompetitive policy about teeth whitening, nor
did it claim it exercised any supervision over the Board of Dental
Examiners.99 The Board argued that because a municipality received
Parker immunity without active state supervision in Hallie v. Eau Claire,100
active state supervision was unnecessary for any state agency.101
Unconvinced, Justice Kennedy declared that “Parker immunity does
not derive from nomenclature alone,” but from supervision by someone
who is accountable to voters in elections.102 Because dentists controlled the
Board, Justice Kennedy found the need for antitrust laws “applies to this
case with full force, particularly in light of the risks licensing boards
dominated by market participants may pose to the free market.”103
However, Kennedy did not go so far as to define when a board is dominated
by market participants or what state involvement was needed, writing, “It
suffices to note that the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible and
context dependent.”104
The Court concluded by holding if “a controlling number of [a]
Board’s decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the
Board regulates, the Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only
if it [is] subject to active supervision by the State.”105

96. Id. at 505 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975); FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)).
97. Id. at 515.
98. Id. at 506 (quoting Ticor, 504 U.S. at 631).
99. Id. at 514–15.
100. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
101. North Carolina State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 510–11.
102. Id. at 511.
103. Id. at 514.
104. Id. at 515.
105. Id. For an excellent synopsis and analysis of Dental Examiners, see Alexandra W.
Jabs, Note, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC: When Will Enough
Active State Supervision Be Enough?, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 44, 45–57 (2016).
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As with many United States Supreme Court opinions, the debate—and
sometimes the more reasoned view—is found in a dissent. Here, Justice
Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented.106 Justice Alito first
observed that “[t]here is nothing new about the structure of the North
Carolina Board”107 and that self-serving by such boards is not new either.108
Alito then recalled that when the Sherman Act was enacted, Congress’s
Commerce Clause power was much smaller, and the states frequently set
price controls.109 As such, Alito believed denying the Board antitrust
immunity “diminish[ed] our traditional respect for federalism and state
sovereignty.”110
Justice Alito viewed the North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners as a state agency.111 In support of that view, he included the
North Carolina statutes referring to the Board as a list of bullet points.112
Alito then attacked the majority for not articulating a clear standard for
when a state agency is privately controlled.113 To underline that point, he
provided three full paragraphs of open questions.114 Finally, Alito deplored
the use of the Court to address regulatory capture, speculating that even the
FTC had been captured.115
While nefarious motives have been ascribed to the Board of Dental
Examiners and its dentist members, two truths are without question: (1) the
Board had the clear statutory authority to regulate the conduct in
question;116 and (2) at the time, any reasonable interpretation of existing law
said Parker immunity was applicable.117
106. North Carolina State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 516 (Alito, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 516 (citing AM. ACAD. OF DENTAL SCI., A HISTORY OF ORAL AND DENTAL
SCIENCE IN AMERICA 197–214 (Samuel S. White ed., 1876)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 517–18 (citing Milton Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown
State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1976)).
110. Id. at 527.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 520–21.
113. Id. at 525.
114. Id. at 526.
115. Id. at 527 n.6.
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-29(b) (2019) (defining what actions constitute the practice
of dentistry). The second definition, behind only “[d]iagnosis, treats, operates or prescribes,”
is “[r]emoves stains, accretions or deposits from the human teeth.” Teeth whitening is
exactly that—the removal of stains, accretions, or deposits.
117. It wasn’t just the North Carolina State Dental Board that held this belief; the
Attorneys General Association, the National Conference of State Legislators, the Council of
State Governments, and sixteen other groups signed on to the action. North Carolina State
Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 498.
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The Board of Dental Examiners’ conduct was not an overt attempt to
thwart competition. The conduct was in fact nothing more than a state
agency fulfilling its statutorily proscribed duty in enforcing a law duly
enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly.118 The issue of “adequate
state supervision” or “active supervision” was a concept no one conceived
of applying to a statutorily designated professional licensing board. While
some commentators among the opponents have approached Dental
Examiners with suggested reform within the confines of the Court’s ruling
itself,119 many others have called for wholesale repeal of licensing laws as
a result.
As a long-time practitioner, writer, speaker, and researcher in this
limited area of law, I am convinced that the opponents of licensing—
irrespective of any philosophical view—are not recognizing the positive
benefits of occupational and professional licensing, be it by an appointed
board or commission or by a state agency not overseen by licensees and
citizens.
III. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING
As set out above in Section II.B., the Redbird study debunked much of
the data and statistics on “wage premium” and “wage distribution” which
had been exploited in smaller, older data sets, and the lack of any bona fide
examples—short of the self-limiting terms of Dental Examiners—of
restraints of trade by any board anywhere in the nation. There are truly
benefits to the public at large, as well as workers, through regulation.120
A. The positive effect.
Despite all the negative rhetoric espoused by opponents of regulation,
there are numerous positive effects, all of which should outweigh some
wage disparity created by licensure.
First and foremost is the true protection of the public health, safety,
and welfare. I am not an economist or sociologist, so I can speak only from
the perspective of a legal practitioner who represents “both sides”: the
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-29(b).
119. See Johnson, supra note 38 (advocating for a “licensing ombudsman” to oversee all
such licensing with broad authority). Other commentators have suggested placing all
licensing boards and commissions under a cabinet level elected position such as the Secretary
of State (found in most states), or appointed entity such as the state’s Department of
Commerce secretary or similar agency.
120. See Redbird, supra note 60.
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independent boards that regulate and licensees that have run afoul of their
regulatory board. I say this with the upmost honesty and candor: if the
conduct I have witnessed by licensees who have appeared before my boards
and those licensees I have represented before other boards is even a small
indication of how persons would behave if unlicensed, the public should
beg its elected leaders to do nothing that would change the status quo. For
some, if they can, they will, and quite frequently their conduct endangers
others.
Sometimes it is an honest mistake, other times ineptitude or a lack of
knowledge or training, but many times the conduct is intentional, and
frequently done to save time or costs: willful failure to obtain a local permit
to avoid the inspection process, electrical wiring done incorrectly (which
could result in fire), gas lines improperly installed or furnaces installed or
maintained inappropriately (which can cause carbon monoxide poisoning),
or engineering, architectural or construction defects (which can result in
injury). All of these occur on a regular basis and are done by persons or
businesses who risk losing their license to engage in the business or
vocation if caught but do misdeeds anyhow.
And such conduct is not limited to the “trades.” We have all read and
heard about medical doctors, lawyers, and Certified Public Accountants
who have engaged in conduct harmful to the public. Some may scoff at the
notion of “protection of the public health, safety, and welfare,” but that is
the judicial and legislative standard required to regulate an occupation or
profession, and every board I am familiar with takes that mandate
seriously.121
The primary purposes of licensing, whether by an independent board
or commission, is three-fold: to ensure persons engaging in the particular
occupation or profession possess the minimum knowledge and skills to
perform the functions required; to ensure continuing competence; and to
take appropriate disciplinary action when a standard is violated. These three
purposes all act in the name of the protection of the public health, safety,
and welfare. Further, most licensing entities require a criminal history

121. As one Auctioneers Commission member observed to me years ago while
discussing the need for licensing, “A barber may give you a bad haircut, but it will grow
back. An unscrupulous auctioneer can take everything your grandpa worked his whole life
for and walk away.” (Note: The Auctioneers Licensing Board has a recovery fund for
citizens who have been financially harmed by a licensed auctioneer. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
83B-4.1 (2019)).
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background check,122 frequently by fingerprints,123 and some require a
credit history.124 Comfort can be found by the citizenry in knowing the
daycare worker or teacher who is with their child much of the day, or the
technician that is in their house or business installing an alarm system, has
a clean background. And if that licensed, registered, or certified worker is
criminally charged, every licensing entity has mechanisms in place to
discover the violation.125
So, the protection of the public is on both ends—an assurance of
knowledge and skill and an assurance that the licensee does not have a
122. The evolution and current status of the myriad ways in which the criminal history
record check requirement for occupational and professional licensing boards are written is
worthy of an exhaustive analysis and its own topic as a law review article. Some state agency
or board statutes are as simplistic as “any felony,” “any felony or misdemeanor,” or “any
felony or misdemeanor that bears on [some criteria],” while others set forth broad categories
of crimes, sometimes by Article number under Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Still others have a “grocery list” of specific offenses that are grounds for denial or
for suspension or revocation. It is also clear when reading these statutes collectively that
either the board itself, or the General Assembly’s Legislative Drafting Division, modeled a
number of boards statutory requirements after each other (e.g., Locksmiths, Nursing Home
Administrators, Marriage and Family Therapists, Licensed Professional Counselors,
Massage and Body Work Therapists, Substances Use Disorder Professionals, Nurses, and
Physical Therapists (except the latter; Physical Therapists only are required to look at six
factors, not seven)). These are essentially the same as the ten factors in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
93B-8.1(b1) (2019).
123. For many years, boards required applicants to send in a copy of a criminal record
from the Clerk of Court of his or her county of residence, or “every county in which you
have resided for the past five years,” or something similar. Needless to say, this was
fundamentally flawed. In the mid-to-late 1990s, licensing entities began seeking legislative
authority for criminal background checks via fingerprinting. Regulations on the National
Criminal Information Center (NCIC) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the national
electronic clearinghouse of crime data, necessitated creation of uniform language for
enabling legislation since the authorization sought by state agencies frequently did not meet
NCIC’s criteria. The requests of fingerprint-based criminal histories for applicants
overwhelmed the State Bureau of Investigation’s Identification Division. During that same
time, the Administrative Office of the Courts began refining its online system, but it was
only good for a state-wide (as opposed to national) check. While the majority of boards
retain, and utilize, fingerprint-based checks, the reliability of private vendors who perform
the same service has begun to supplant that process.
124. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-12(a)(32) (2019) (private protective services); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 74D-10(a)(20) (2019) (alarm systems businesses); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
85B-8(a)(1) (2019) (auctioneers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-10(a)(3) (2019) (general
contractors). The statutory authority is typically “financial responsibility.”
125. Almost all boards’ enabling acts govern both initial application and renewal. Some
state agencies’ or boards’ statutes say “charged,” others say “arrest” or “arrest or
indictment,” while others just say “conviction.” Some state agencies’ or boards’ statutes
give a time period to report, for example, “five days” or “thirty days,” while others only
require that it be reported at the time of renewal of the license.
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tendency toward criminal behavior. This is something few citizens could
afford to determine themselves were it not for the state. Yet, the cost
benefits to individuals and businesses do not end there.
B. Cost benefits to businesses and private citizens
While I am no economist, it is surprising that with the many studies
performed to date, there has not yet been a study on the economic benefits
of occupational licensing.126 The benefits seem numerous.
1. It saves businesses and citizens time and money
The average small business cannot afford to vet everyone it hires to
perform a task. Just because you have a truck with your name on it does
not mean you know that hot is on the left, cold is on the right, and water
runs downhill. A plumbing license ensures—at no cost to the business or
individual citizen—that the person has the requisite skills to install that
automated dishwasher in your restaurant or re-plumb your master bathroom
during remodeling of your house. The licensee has paid for that assurance,
not the consumer.
Additionally, with a licensed person performing whatever the service,
a business or individual has a place for a redress of a grievance in many
situations, and for a few licensed occupations and professions a bond is
required,127 liability insurance is required,128 or there is a “recovery fund”
to make a citizen whole for some loss at the hands of the licensee.129 In
most instances, it is financially unfeasible for a small business or the

126. A mere Google search of the phrase “economic benefits of occupational licensing”
produces only “it’s bad” or “reform” studies and articles.
127. While once very common for occupations and professions, as well as elected persons
such as a sheriff, bonds have been replaced by insurance requirements, and in a few
instances, recovery funds. A bond is still required for a few, such as a licensed river
navigational pilot, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89D-16(a)(4) (2019), and an irrigation contractor, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 89D-16(a)(4).
128. Liability insurance is required for a security guard and patrol license, armored car
license, and a private investigator license if armed with a firearm under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
74C-10(e) (2019); for an alarm installation license under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74D-9(d) (2019);
for a funeral director license unless employed by a licensed funeral establishment under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-210.25 (a)(2)(d) (2019); and for a home inspector license under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-151.58 (2019).
129. Some boards and commissions have done away with a bond requirement in lieu of
a recovery fund to make an aggrieved citizen whole. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23
(2019) (N.C. State Bar); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83B-4.1 (2019) (Auctioneers Commission); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 87-15.5 to -15.9 (2019) (Licensing Board for General Contractors); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 93A, art. 2 (2019) (Real Estate Commission).
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average citizen to bring a civil action against a person or company for
damages. A bond or insurance required as a condition of licensing protects
the public and saves them time and money.
2. Gives businesses and private citizens a “seal of approval”
Yes, there is the Better Business Bureau, and online referral services
such as Angie’s List™ and HomeAdvisor®, but there is no enforcement
behind any of these services that recommend or rate a business or service
provider.130 With a licensing process in place, a state is reassuring—almost
guaranteeing—that the business or person that holds the license has met
certain standards, that they are knowledgeable and possess certain skills and
abilities, that they have an acceptable personal history, that they are
financially stable or are insured, and that there is an entity monitoring the
licensee’s behavior that can take action if the licensee “fails to do right.”
No private entity, be it an online review service or some private association
that offers “certification,” can give this same protection.131
3. An economy of scale
Many of our business and economic systems in this nation, a
capitalistic society, operate on an economy of scale. The more persons
participating in, and contributing financially to, an operation, the less it
costs to operate. While licensing entities within a state agency are typically
funded at least partially by tax dollars, in North Carolina the independent
occupational licensing boards and commissions are 100% receipt
supported. Those “receipts” are almost exclusively license fees.132 The
entire licensing function, from initial application to renewal, to monitoring,
to tracking continuing education, to any necessary complaint investigation,
to disciplinary proceedings if warranted are all funded solely by the persons
engaged in that occupation or profession. Boards and commissions do not
discourage applicants; they are not some form of monopoly. Instead, boards
and commissions encourage applicants because it is only through licensee
130. Reliance on such services is discussed below. See discussion infra III.D.
131. Numerous commentators have suggested that state-mandated licensing can be
replaced with “certification” or “credentialing” by a private, for-profit organization with no
effect on the protection of the public.
132. A few boards are allowed to accept funds or “contributions” beyond license fees.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 88A-8 (2015) (electrolysists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89D-22(b)
(2015) (landscape contractors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-90-113.33 (2019) (substance use
disorder professionals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.80A(d) (2019) (occupational therapists);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-370 (2019) (dietitians/nutritionists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-385(g)
(2019) (pastoral counselors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90A-75(b) (2019) (on-site wastewater
treatment facility operators).
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funds that such an entity can continue to operate, and to do so it must have
new applicants and an economy of scale.
C. It’s an incentive to “do right”
I have also admitted I am no sociologist, but experience has shown me
that when a person’s livelihood, and that of others in that person’s employ,
depends on a license, there is a greater incentive to perform a service in the
correct or proper manner. We will all admit and recognize that humans are
human and all will take shortcuts or bend rules to accomplish a task,
especially if there is an economic incentive to do so.133 However, licensing
provides an incentive to do all things related to the occupation or profession
properly; the statutes and administrative rules governing that occupation or
profession—which may or may not include a code of conduct—are an
economic incentive that govern society. If “doing right” protects a person’s
right to continue to be employed in their chosen field, that person is more
inclined to follow the mandates established by the elected legislators and
their peers.
D. Should Angie’s List™ be the judge?
Again, many of the commentators who oppose occupational licensing,
be it a state agency or an independent board, advocate for a free-market
system to control occupations and professions, which is not surprising.
Most are “free-market” think tanks and advocacy groups. 134
1. No place for laissez-faire capitalism
Often, laissez-faire capitalism is also referred to as free-market
capitalism.135 Theorized in a time of mercantilism,136 and at the birth and

133. One commentator, in reviewing the works of Morris Kleiner, see sources cited supra
note 50, describes the licensing of occupations as “a very forceful intervention in markets”
observing, “[t]he prospect of losing that license then provides a powerful incentive to follow
proscribed behaviors.” Reinhardt, supra note 51, at 320.
134. See, e.g., MERCATUS, https://www.mercatus.org [https://perma.cc/H2V5-MKAK];
THE HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org [https://perma.cc/4NNH-B6R3]; CATO
INST., https://www.cato.org/ [https://perma.cc/Z4KC-SQDJ].
135. Simply put, laissez-faire translates to “leave us alone,” as in the government should
remain out of the economy and instead allow individuals to freely carry out their own
economic affairs.
136. “Mercantilism” is the economic theory that trade generates wealth and is stimulated
by the accumulation of profitable balances, which a government should encourage by means
of protectionism. It was common in Europe in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries,
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during the growth of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, it is most closely associated with Adam Smith and
other prominent thinkers. As mercantilism was rejected and capitalism
developed as the dominant economic system in the United States, Great
Britain, much of Europe, and parts of Asia, the idea of government control
of the economy was replaced with a focus on individuals. On the economic
spectrum, laissez-faire capitalism is considered a right-wing ideology
fundamentally based on private ownership, competition, free trade,
self-reliance, self-interest, and the principles of supply and demand.137 In
contemplating these, it is easy to see how and why occupational and
professional licensing has become a target for free trade advocates. In their
view, regulation creates “vocational closure” and acts as a barrier to entry
into a trade or profession.138 The market, they argue, should determine who
will survive in a particular profession.
The open market, however, is no place for determining if someone has
the knowledge, training, and skills to be an engineer, a surveyor, an
architect, a dentist, an embalmer, a heating contractor, or a veterinarian.
The only way for the market to make this determination is after the person
has already done harm. While the market may determine the best or most
affordable product, elected state representatives determine how to best
protect the public. Such a determination is too important to leave to the
forces of the free-market.
In defense of a free-market approach, advocates claim that modern,
generally accessible ranking and referral businesses (and that is what they
are, a for-profit “business”) such as Angie’s List™ (for contractors,
repairmen, etc., and more); CareDash, HealthGrades®, and RateMDs (for
doctors); and Avvo® and Justia (for attorneys), provide all the protection
needed to protect the public.139 The argument is that while consumers may
and England enforced a strong system of mercantilism on its colonies, including what is now
the United States.
137. Laissez-Fair Capitalism, HIST. CRUNCH (July 29, 2019), https://www.historycrunch.
com/laissez-faire-capitalism.html [https://perma.cc/296F-JAYK].
138. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 50; Lee McGrath, A Primer on Occupational
Licensing with Professor Morris Kleiner, LIBERTY & L. (Inst. for Just., Arlington, Va.), Apr.
2008, at 8, https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/1426/02/LL_4-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8BKZ975].
139. An online search, picking somewhat random occupations and professions, tends to
indicate there are ratings and review sites (or “leads generators”) for virtually everyone. For
doctors, there are multiple; so many, in fact, one site is a “top 10 best” rating site for rating
sites for doctors. See OPENMD, http://www.openmd.com [https://perma.cc/7976-AXNX].
For the home repair and construction trades, there are multiple as well, such as
HomeAdvisor®, Houzz, Porch, Thumbtack, Yelp, and Bark. With many, and particularly
HomeAdvisor, what appears to be a ratings and review site, is in actuality a service where
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have needed government oversight and protection through licensing prior
to the internet age, avenues like Yelp and Angie’s List have given another
avenue to protect the public, thus state regulation is no longer necessary.
The first inkling of this arose when a bill was introduced in the
Washington State House of Representatives in 2017.140 The brainchild of a
free-market think-tank, the Washington Policy Center, the arguments were
the same mantra: They don’t want to establish and maintain standards, they
want to cut out competition. This same proposal has been suggested by
others since, as cited herein.
And yet, there is a problem: these online rating services are unreliable.
The Consumer Federation of America and Consumer Reports have both
questioned the veracity of Angie’s List™ and similar services.141 An article
in the venerable business magazine Forbes explains that advertisers get a
preferential rating, that bad reviews can be removed, and that it is easy for
a business to have false reviews posted to boost its ratings.142 These internet
sites are not exactly reliable.
The Forbes article relates to a comparison of a plumbing company in
San Francisco. Angie’s List™ gave it an F while the Better Business
Bureau gave it an A+.143 Yelp users gave it an average of 2.5 stars out of
five, while Consumer Checkbook subscribers rated the company as
“superior.”144
It makes no sense for a government to abdicate its role of protecting its
citizenry by abolishing a system of protection that costs the citizens nothing
in favor of a “free market” where the information the citizen relies on is
inaccurate and can be easily manipulated. Further, a consumer is left to

businesspersons pay a fee for leads generated by visitors to the site. Angie’s List™ and
HomeAdvisor® are owned by the same parent company.
140. H.B. 1361, 65th Leg., 2017 Sess. (Wash. 2017). Introduced by Rep. Matt
Manweller, this bill did not get beyond a committee hearing and by resolution was
reintroduced in 2018 but did not pass. The bill called for a state-sponsored online portal as
opposed to the private, for-profit services.
141. Kate Gibson, Angie’s List Favors Its Own Advertisers, Consumer Group Warns,
CNBC (Apr. 30, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/angies-list-reviewsfavor-its-own-advertisers-consumer-group-warns/ [https://perma.cc/VP5A-W2VB].
142. Eric Goldman, Angie’s List Must Defend Fraud Charges Over Pay-to-Play Review
Manipulation, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2015/08/
12/angies-list-must-defend-fraud-charges-over-pay-to-play-review-manipulation/?sh=7239
f7f65ee7 [https://perma.cc/43DM-76E4].
143. Id.
144. It is worthy of note that Consumer Report considered the review service Consumer’s
Checkbook more reliable since it automatically surveys customers rather than waiting until
a customer with selfish motivations posts a review themself.
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their own devices with the only recourse being a civil lawsuit—few can
afford such.
E. A world without licensing.
If violations of the law, administrative rules, various codes, regulations
and ordinances, and the criminal charges related and unrelated to the
licensed profession or occupation are indicative of how a person will behave
with a state agency controlling their livelihood, a world without licensing
would be frightening. We as a state and nation have so many entities, public
and private, engaged in “consumer protection” because consumers need
protecting. For whatever inexplicable reason, humans prey on other
humans, both physically and financially.
While occupational and professional licensing by a government entity
may not be perfect in the eyes of all, it is better than the alternative. And
when it comes to independent licensing boards and commissions, it is the
people governing themselves.
IV. GOVERNMENT CLOSEST TO THE PEOPLE
It is undoubtedly ironic that the majority of the persons and entities,
especially the “think-tanks,” that proffer these anti-licensing arguments are
also self-proclaimed “federalists”145 and believe that government should be
at a state and local level and remain close to the people. Their views are at
odds with each other.
A. The vast majority of board and commission members are appointed.
There are fifty-four independent occupational licensing boards in
North Carolina.146 Each board is comprised of a combination of regulated
members and members of the public.147 Several licensing boards employ a
procedure in which members are elected by the governed occupation or
profession, while the Governor ultimately makes the appointment for some

145. Federalism is, in simple terms, the distribution of power between a central authority
(i.e., a government) and the constituent. Historically, in America, federalism is associated
with the founding of our nation, and it became a symbolic name for advocates of our current
constitutional form of government.
146. See supra note 4.
147. Some boards and commissions have a seat for an elected or appointed official, state
or local, or that official’s designee. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89E-4(b) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-182(a) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90A-55(a) (2019).
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of the boards.148 Since they perform an executive branch function, the
licensing boards are considered executive agencies. The legislature has
slowly encroached upon the Governor’s executive power over the past two
decades, meaning the appointments have become more broadly based and
are frequently “bi-partisan.”149
In North Carolina, there is a strong tradition of the state’s chief
executive governing through extensive appointment powers.150
A
gubernatorial appointment is a delegation of power by that appointing
authority to, ostensibly, act in accordance with the policies and philosophy
of the appointing authority.151 An appointed board or commission is merely
an extension of the Governor. It is similar to a Governor appointing a
cabinet secretary to oversee a department, except the appointed board is
comprised of a group of persons. As is so dear to us living in a democracy,
it is the citizens—the public—governing in the purest form.

148. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-17 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22 (2019); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-85.7 (2019), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.21(b) (2019), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-238
(2019).
149. There has been pushback from the executive branch over the past six years
beginning with Republican Governor Pat McCrory, who challenged the legislative
appointment of members to a newly created panel, the “Coal Ash Management
Commission.” State v. Berger, 781 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. 2016). He prevailed. That decision
was successfully cited by Democratic Governor Roy Cooper in opposing a majority of
legislative appointments to various boards and commissions, one of which was an
occupational licensing board. Cooper v. Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98 (N.C. 2018). There is yet
another challenge by Cooper to the legislature usurping executive power through the
appointment process pending in Wake County Superior Court. Verified Complaint, Cooper
v. Berger, 20 CVS 09542 (Wake Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2020).
150. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. 1982) (discussing the
history of executive appointment powers in North Carolina).
151. The McCrory court made clear that the Governor’s ability to control executive
branch officers, boards, and commissions—and concomitantly, the exercise of the final
executive authority by those executive entities—depends on the Governor’s “ability to
appoint [such officials] to supervise their day-to-day activities.” Berger, 781 S.E.2d at 256.
This appears contrary to Justice Kennedy’s conclusion in Dental Examiners that only those
that answer to the voters at the ballot box can provide active state supervision. North
Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 574 U.S. at 511. Or does it mean that an appointee,
whether a department head (i.e., “Secretary of . . .”) or anyone else including an appointee
to a board or commission with delegated authority, also answers to that same ballot box?
The distinction with the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners is that all members,
except one, are elected from the licensed profession. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (2019).
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B. The statutory composition of North Carolina’s boards and
commissions would thwart any attempt at “conspiracy.”
According to the writings of the many commentators opposed to
occupational and professional licensing, particularly licensing boards, every
board is nothing more than a cabal. According to these commentators, the
boards are guilds, unions, or monopolistic trusts bent on keeping others
from entering “their” profession. Their conspiracy theories read like a Dan
Brown novel with hints of intrigue and secret handshakes. Such is not the
case.
The statements of these commentators are mere conjecture. Research,
a little common sense, and some knowledge of human nature quickly shows
how difficult that would be. While some of North Carolina’s boards are as
small as five to seven members, typically with three to five licensed
members and one or two public members,152 most of the other boards are
larger with not only different appointing authorities (i.e., Governor, Speaker
of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate), but also, oftentimes,
with appointments made from a statutorily designated organization or
entity.153
 Licensing Board for General Contractors—nine total
members: five licensees with proscribed backgrounds; three
public; one engineer with a background in structural
engineering.154
 State Board of Plumbing, Heating and Fire Sprinkler
Contractors—seven total members, all Governor-appointed:
one from an engineering school; one municipal plumbing or
mechanical inspector; one air conditioning contractor; one
licensed plumbing contractor; one licensed heating contractor;
one licensed fire sprinkler contractor; one public.155
 State Board of Electrical Contractors—seven total members,
five Governor-appointed and two others: one designated by
Commissioner of Insurance; one from UNC faculty electrical
engineer; one municipal electrical inspector; one

152. Interestingly, the State Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators has a
majority of public members. Of the seven members, four are “noninstitutional members,
with no direct financial interest in nursing homes,” and three are from the industry with
criteria relating to for-profit and non-profit employers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-277 (2019).
153. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-2 (2019), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-39 (2019)
(noting that different members of the Board must possess different qualifications and may
be appointed by different individuals).
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-2.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-16 (2019).
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representative of the Carolinas Electrical Contractors
Association; two public.156
State Board of Refrigeration Examiners—seven total
members, all Governor-appointed: one manufacturer; one
UNC faculty engineer school; one faculty UNC School of
Public Health; one engineer with a background in
refrigeration; one public.157

The list could go on and on and include Landscape Contractors,158 Soil
Scientists,159 the Medical Board,160 and the Respiratory Care Board.161 Of
the fifty-four boards and commissions defined by section 93B-1(2) of the
North Carolina General Statutes, as an “occupational licensing board,”
nineteen have one or more non-licensee appointees from a specific field of
knowledge. As to the “public” members, most of the appointment statutes
clearly state that the appointee cannot be engaged in or associated with the
licensed profession or kin to someone who is.162 Other appointment statutes
provide that appointments should reflect the state in regard to gender,
ethnic, racial, and age composition,163 facts generally taken into
consideration, along with geographical location, by appointing authorities
to ensure equal representation across the state.
If that alone is insufficient to show self-governance by the people and
a virtually impossible scenario where a conspiracy to engage in
monopolistic behavior could occur, a look at the appointing authority who
makes the appointments should resolve such concerns.164 Of the fifty-four
boards and commissions defined as occupational licensing boards, the
authority to appoint members is shared by the Governor, the Speaker of the
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-39.
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-52 (2019).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89D-14 (2019).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89F-4 (2019).
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2 (2019).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-649 (2019).
162. For instance, the Medical Board’s appointments statute states that a public member
cannot be a healthcare provider or related to a healthcare provider and then defines
“healthcare provider.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-1(b)(1) (2019). The Interpreters and
Translators statute says a public member cannot have a family member who is deaf or hard
of hearing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90D-5(b)(9) (2019).
163. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-238 (2019) (stating that, for the North Carolina State
Board of Opticians, “the Board must ensure that its candidates reflect the composition of the
State with regards to gender, ethnic, racial, and age composition”).
164. For a reference to the judicial battles between Governors and the legislature over
who has authority over appointments to executive branch boards and commissions, see
discussion supra note 149.
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House, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate in twenty instances.165
Since appointments tend to be “political” and reflect the policies and
philosophy of the appointing authority, suffice it to say that in these
politically divided times, all are not of a like mind.
C. Everything every conservative candidate says about how government
should operate.
How many times have we heard the phrase from candidates and others
that “state government should be run like a business?” Well, it is, but only
in one area, and no other aspect of government comes close: the
“independent” state occupational and professional licensing boards.
Of the fifty-four boards, each one is receipt-supported, and not a single
tax dollar goes to their operation.166 Their employees are employees of the
board or commission,167 and all salaries and benefits168 are paid by the
board. The boards manage their finances, typically through a “finance
committee” made up of members, and for the most part, maintain balanced
budgets.169 At least eleven boards (and two commissions) have the statutory
authority to rent or lease office space outside the state government leasing
process, which includes the authority to own their own building.170 Six
165. A number of these appointment statutes violate State v. Berger, 781 S.E.2d 248
(N.C. 2016). Following that case, the legislature modified N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-4(b)
(2019), regarding the Private Protective Services Board, later defined as a “state agency
licensing board” in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1(3) (2019), but did nothing to change any of the
others. See Act of June 21, 2019, ch. 32, sec. 4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 32 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-4).
166. A few boards even have a statutory prohibition against using general revenues of the
State. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-45 (2019).
167. Whether a board or commission was staffed by State employees or its own
employees was the sole distinguishing fact in the pre-2019 version of the definition found in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1. See Act of July 8, 2019, ch. 91, sec. 2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 91
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1).
168. The only exception to these is that a few boards’ employees remain in the state
retirement system. See, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 135-1.1. This fact is very complicated, with its
roots in actions by the General Assembly in the mid-1980s to make these boards
independent. The legal ramifications, and equities, of terminating a vested employee’s
benefits ended up with a convoluted result which time has slowly resolved.
169. By no means, however, is this authority “independent.” The multiple audits and
reporting requirements are discussed in Part VI, below. In recent history, two boards, the
Electrologists and the Opticians have had financial issues, but not necessarily of their own
making. The Opticians waited too late; they were unsuccessful with efforts in the legislature
to authorize a fee increase during two Sessions.
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93E-1-5(h) (2019) (granting the Appraisal Board the power to
acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83A-3(c) (2019) (granting the Board of
Architecture the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-3.1(c) (2019)
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boards own their own buildings, financed through conventional financing
just like any other business.171
Advocates for eliminating occupational and professional licensing
boards in favor of certification or registration by private, for-profit
organizations fail to recognize the cost savings of the current system.
Surely, the benefits of a receipt-supported state entity outweigh the claimed
additional expense of licensure.
V. “ACTIVE STATE SUPERVISION”
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dental
Examiners, there has been much debate as states across the nation have
struggled to determine what constitutes “active state supervision.”172 For
the state of North Carolina, the primary focus herein, “active state
supervision” already exists; it was just not presented in such a manner that
it could be considered by the federal courts.173

(granting the Auctioneers Commission the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-23(d) (2019) (granting the N.C. State Bar Council the power to acquire real property);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-9.1(a) (2019) (granting the Licensing Board for General Contractors
the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-18 (2019) (granting the Board of
Plumbing and Heating Contractors the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
87-42 (2019) (granting the Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors the power to acquire
real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-10(i) (2019) (granting the Board of Examiners for
Engineers and Surveyors the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-85.11A(a) (2019) (granting the Board of Pharmacy the power to acquire real property);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.23(b)(23) (2019) (granting the Board of Nursing the power to
acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.23(h1) (2019) (granting the Board of
Funeral Services the power to acquire real property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12(c)(17) (2019)
(granting the Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners the power to acquire real
property); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-3(f) (2019) (granting the Real Estate Commission the
power to acquire real property).
171. These boards are the Appraisal Board, Auctioneers, Attorneys, General Contractors,
Nurses, and the Real Estate Commission.
172. For an excellent discussion of the topic, see Jabs, supra note 105, at 44. The holding
by the United States Supreme Court in Dental Examiners is counter to holdings of various
United States Circuit Courts on the issue of Parker immunity for independent state licensing
boards. Id. at 56, n.118.
173. Why? As stated earlier, no one thought that the North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners lacked Parker immunity. It is worth noting that at every opportunity
during the litigation of that matter the FTC would drop the word “State” from the Board’s
statutory name.
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A. Appointed with the power to remove
The Governor of North Carolina makes the vast majority of
appointments to state occupational licensing boards.174 Even in those few
instances where the members are chosen or elected by an outside group,
such as a trade association, the Governor still makes the actual
appointment.175 This is no different than the Governor making hundreds of
“mini-cabinet secretary” appointments. In both scenarios, the Governor is
appointing persons he or she trusts to carry out the policies of the Executive
Branch and ensure that the law is faithfully executed. And he or she has the
power to remove, by statute or inherently, as the appointing authority. 176
This is the same authority a governor has over a cabinet secretary, or an
employee in the actual Office of the Governor. The Governor’s
appointments—all of them—are vetted by the Boards and Commissions
staff within the Office of the Governor. Most often, they tend to come from
within the same political party as the person appointing them and upon
recommendation of supporters. My experience with boards for over two
decades, with multiple changes in party affiliation between Governors and
the leadership of our General Assembly, has been that the appointments by
the Speaker and the President Pro Tem tend to be chosen in a similar
manner; they choose from their own political party and from supporters (or
the supporters of members of whichever body). And beyond just the
appointment of a few members on select boards, the legislature has overtly
exercised its oversight of these “independent” licensing boards, in addition
to the Governor’s oversight.

174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-12(a) (2019) (granting the Governor the powers and
duties to “see that all offices are filled” and “[t]o make the appointments”).
175. It is worthy to note that elections for membership appear only in the medical or
medically-related boards. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2(a) (2019) (establishing the
Medical Board, of which the Governor appoints eleven of thirteen members: six of his or her
choosing (based on recommendations made by the Review Panel) and five upon
recommendation of various groups); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.7(a) (2019) (describing
selection of the Board of Pharmacy, which consists of six members with five elected then
“commissioned” by the Governor and one public member appointed by the Governor); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-116 (2019) (establishing the Board of Examiners in Optometry, of which
the Governor appoints all seven members by selecting two members of the public at large
and five from lists provided by the State Optometric Society); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-238
(2019) (creating the Board of Opticians, of which the Governor appoints all seven members
with five elected from the Board and two members of the public).
176. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2(d) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.7(a); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-116; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-238.
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B. Audit requirements
While purportedly “independent” and receipt-supported, these
occupational licensing boards do not lack oversight in any way when it
comes to financial matters. Their financial oversight may likely exceed that
of the more typical state agency. First, like all state agencies and
institutions, the section 93B-1(2) occupational licensing boards are subject
to audit by the State Auditor’s Office.177 Additionally, “each occupational
licensing board with a budget of at least . . . $50,000.00 shall conduct an
annual financial audit of its operations and provide a copy to the State
Auditor.”178 That is just the State Auditor’s oversight; by no means does it
end there. By October thirty-first of each year, every occupational licensing
board must file a financial report “with the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, the Office of State Budget and Management, and the Joint
Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee.”179 These
financial reports “include[] the source and amount of all funds credited to,”
and disbursed by, the board.180 There is even a sanction, the freezing of
funds, for failure of a board to prepare and forward this report.181
Additionally, the active oversight of these boards extends well beyond
mere financial reporting and audits. Chapter 93B contains additional and
more exhaustive reporting requirements, well beyond those required of
other Executive Branch agencies and institutions. Section 93B-2(a) of the
North Carolina General Statutes requires an annual report containing
seventeen specified categories of information from simple information (i.e.,
the name and address of each board member and number of licensees), to
information on applicants, examination statistics, disciplinary actions,
applicants with criminal convictions, the substance of any legislation that
may be requested by the board in the upcoming session of the General
Assembly, and the substance of any anticipated administrative rule
adoptions or amendments.182 Statutory provisions providing supervision
and oversight of these boards and commissions extend beyond Chapter 93B
of the North Carolina General Statutes, which regulates only occupational
and state agency licensing boards.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-4(a) (2019).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-4(b) (2019).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-2(b) (2019).
Id.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-2(a) (2019).
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Comprehensive Annual Financial Report—Office of State
Controller (OSC)—annually (July)183
Fee Information Report—OSBM—annually (December)184
Employment and Payroll Survey—US Department of
Commerce—annually (April)185
Statement of Economic Interest (board members)—State
Ethics Commission—upon appointment then every two
years186
License/Fee Collection Report—North Carolina Department
of Revenue—quarterly187
Lease Purchase and Installment Purchase Report—OSBM—
annually (September)188
Notice of Board Meetings—SOS and Office of the Governor,
Boards and Commissions—annually189
Records Retention and Disposition Schedule—Department of
Cultural Resources, Division of Historical Records—updated
as required190
Report on Economic Impact of Anticipated Rules—OSBM—
annually (April)191

183. OFF. OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT (2020), https://files.nc.gov/ncosc/CAFR/2020/2020_Comprehe
nsive_Annual_Financial_Report-Bookmarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/B88H-BDVE].
184. OFF. OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., NORTH CAROLINA STATE GOVERNMENT FEE
REPORT (2020), https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/documents/files/Fee-Report_2018-19Summary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/56A5-VUFJ].
185. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2019 ANN. SURV. OF PUB. EMP. & PAYROLL, https://www.cen
sux.gov/programs-surveys/apes/data/datasetstables/2019.htmls [https://perma.cc/32SH-KM
B5].
186. Statements of Economic Interest (SEIs), N.C. STATE ETHICS COMM’N, https://ethics.
nc.gov/seis [https://perma.cc/8KTY-J9W4].
187. Reports and Statistics, N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.ncdor.gov/reportsand-statistics [https://perma.cc/MBR6-CB68].
188. OFF. OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., LEASE PURCHASE AND INSTALLMENT PURCHASE
ACTIVITY (2006), https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/documents/files/2-15-2006LeasePurchasefina
l.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FY5-Z3DZ].
189. N.C. SEC’Y OF STATE ELAINE F. MARSHALL, PUBLIC MEETINGS CALENDAR,
https://www.sosnc.gov/online_services/calendar/Search [https://perma.cc.4LRF-YKR9].
190. N.C. DEP’T OF NAT. & CULTURAL RES., RECORDS RETENTION AND DISPOSITION
SCHEDULE (2019), https://files.nc.gov/dncr-archives/documents/files/2019_local_standards.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W7RS-UMHR].
191. N.C. OFF. OF STATE BUDGET AND MGMT., NORTH CAROLINA RULES WITH ECONOMIC
IMPACT (2019), https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/documents/files/Report_2019_NCRulesWithEc
onomicImpact.pdf [https://perm.cc/R35Y-LYZF].
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Statewide Accounts Receivable Report—OSC—annually
(September)192
State Portal Report—Office of Information Technology
Services—as required193

In addition to those required by various “outside sources,” some boards
have additional reports or oversight requirements in their enabling
statutes.194
It is clear that the amount of reporting the boards are required to do
constitutes active supervision. Because of this supervision, it is impossible
to say with any intellectual honesty that the occupational boards and
commissions are running amuck in North Carolina, devoid of supervision
or oversight as alleged by their detractors.

192. N.C. OFF. OF STATE CONTROLLER, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE REPORT (2019),
https://files.nc.gov/ncosc/documents/AR_quarterly/2019_Accounts_Receivable_Repor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9T32-CY8E].
193. KEITH WERNER, N.C. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH., STATE PORTAL REPORT (2017),
https://files.nc.gov/ncdit/documents/files/State-Portal-Report-01-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C8T8-ZX53]. This list is by no means exhaustive. In fact, I found thirteen other statutory
reporting requirements not included within this list—more legislative oversight than many
cabinet-level state agencies—however, at the behest of my editors, I have begrudgingly
omitted them.
194. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86A-7(e) (2019) (requiring the Board of Barber Examiners
to report annually to the Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-8 (2019) (requiring the Board of
General Contractors to report annually to the Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-20 (2019)
(requiring the Board of Plumbing and Heating Contractors to report annually to the
Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89B-8 (2019) (requiring the Board of Foresters to report
annually to the Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-12 (2019) (requiring the Board of
Examiners for Engineers and Surveyors to report annually to the Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 89D-15(14) (2019) (requiring the Landscape Contractors’ Licensing Board to maintain an
annual report to be made available to licensees and other concerned parties); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-44 (2019) (requiring the Board of Dental Examiners to report annually to the Governor);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.9 (2019) (requiring the Board of Pharmacy to report annually to the
Governor and the presiding officer of each house of the General Assembly); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-210.70(d) (2019) (requiring the Board of Funeral Services to present annually a report
regarding preneed trusts to the General Assembly); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.10 (2019)
(requiring the Psychology Board to report annually to the Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-270.69(9) (2019) (requiring the Board of Occupational Therapy to report annually to the
Governor and General Assembly); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-356(10) (2019) (requiring the
Board of Dietetics/Nutrition to report annually to the Governor and General Assembly); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-652(10) (2019) (requiring the Respiratory Care Board to report annually to
the Governor, General Assembly, N.C. Medical Board, N.C. Hospital Association and N.C.
Society of Respiratory Care); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12(13) (2019) (requiring the Board of
Certified Public Accountant Examiners to report annually to the Governor).
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C. Additional existing oversight
In any discussion of state agencies in North Carolina and oversight, it
is impossible to ignore the substantial role played by a ten-member
commission, appointed by the leaders of the House and Senate,195 tasked
with approving all administrative rules promulgated by state agencies—
including occupational licensing boards—prior to them being finalized: the
Rules Review Commission (RRC).196
While some agencies are exempt from rulemaking,197 there is no
exception for any type of licensing entity in North Carolina. In reviewing
a board’s rules, the standards or criteria applied by the RRC are:
1. Is the proposed rule within the authority delegated to the board by the
General Assembly;
2. Is the rule clear and unambiguous;
3. Is the rule reasonably necessary to implement or interpret an enactment
of the General Assembly, the United States Congress, or a regulation of a
federal agency; and
4. Was the rule adopted in accordance with Part 2 of Article 2A of Chapter
150B?198

But the oversight does not end there. There are fiscal note
requirements in certain instances,199 as well as a procedure for legislative
review if more than ten persons object to a proposed rule or amendment to
a rule.200
Even Darren Bakst of the John Locke Foundation, in his policy report
referred to the RRC as “much-needed;” two of his seven proposed reforms
are very constructive suggestions for how to strengthen the RRC’s

195. The appointments to this body are also currently being contested by Governor Roy
Cooper in Verified Complaint 2–4, Cooper v. Berger, 17CV006465 (Wake Cnty. Super. Ct.
May 26, 2017). See also discussion supra note 149.
196. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-30.1 (2019) (creating the Rules Review Commission);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-21.1 to -21.7 (2019) (containing the Administrative Procedures
Act, describing the rulemaking process and procedures). Although the appointees are all
legislative, the RRC clearly fulfills an Executive Branch function.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c)–(d) (2019).
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.9 (2019).
199. Id.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.3(b)(1)–(b)(2) (2019).
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oversight.201 Bakst goes on to observe that by delegating to state agencies,
which include occupational licensing boards, the power to adopt
administrative rules to address the specific subject matter of the regulated,
it is a delegation of state authority, with the RRC serving as the overseer.202
Although the RRC provides legislative oversight, it is oversight
nonetheless.
VI. SHORTCOMINGS ARE BEING ADDRESSED
As with any analysis of an issue or debate, positives typically result,
and the analysis of occupational and professional licensing by its detractors
is no different. One of the most legitimate, and truthfully pressing, was or
is “mobility” or “portability” for licensees—the ability to physically move
from one state to another and remain licensed without having to jump
through new or additional hoops, or to engage in an interstate or multi-state
practice, is important for all the reasons the detractors state. For reasons
rooted in the tenants of state sovereignty and federalism there is no national
license for anything.203 Many boards and commissions, and other state
entities that license vocations in North Carolina, have comity or reciprocity
with other states, but admittedly it can be an onerous process. One of the
areas of greatest concern is former military members and the spouses of
active-duty military. North Carolina has a history of working hard to be a
military friendly state, and its legislature has stepped up in this regard.
A. Most boards already have reciprocity or comity
While the two terms tend to be used interchangeably, there is a
difference between “reciprocity” and “comity” when it comes to licensing.
Comity is recognition by one state of the license issued by another state.
Comity typically comes with conditions, such as having been licensed for
some period of years. Reciprocity means a state recognizes a license issued
201. DAREN BAKST, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: SEVEN REFORMS FOR SENSIBLE
REGULATORY POLICY IN NORTH CAROLINA 5 (2010), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/polic
yReports/regulatoryreforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FVZ-LAP8].
202. Id. at 6.
203. See discussion supra Introduction subpart.D (discussing the state police power in
connection with occupational licensing boards and the federal government). For instance,
every state has its own driver’s license; each is just recognized in every other state. And
each state has slightly different criteria—its own—to obtain that license. Albeit, for every
occupation and profession I have represented for over 25 years, I have yet to be at a national
meeting of the whatever association where there was not a discussion of a “national ______
license.” I quickly became unpopular by explaining it cannot happen—so I stopped. Now,
the discussion is compacts, a more viable option. See discussion infra VI.C.
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by another state without any additional process. Typically, there is a
condition in the licensing law that says the originating state’s law cannot be
less stringent than the accepting state’s law. This is a pre-analysis in most
cases and the occupational licensing board or state agency keeps a list of
reciprocal states.
A majority of the fifty-four occupational licensing boards in North
Carolina have either comity or reciprocity and have had for years.204 This
has provided an opportunity for mobility, portability, and interstate practice.
It is very common in our border counties and municipalities for many
persons—and not just the medical and medically related professions—to
have a license in the adjoining state including attorneys, auctioneers, real
estate brokers, all varieties of contractors, and CPAs.
B. Military and military spouses
When the issue of shortcomings of occupational and professional
licensing first arose, and the effect that moving from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction has on former military and the spouses of active duty military
who desire to hold, or hold a license, the North Carolina General Assembly
responded. Aside from the gradual addition of oversight and reporting
requirements, the amendment to Chapter 93B by the addition of subsection
15.1 in 2012 was the first major systemic change made in this state.205
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74F-8(a)–(b) (2019) (locksmiths; comity; “resides in this State
and has at least three years’ experience;” reciprocity; “resides in a state that recognizes
licenses issued by the Board”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (2019) (State Bar; attorneys, for
pro hac vice status); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85B-5(a) (auctioneers; reciprocity; “not more
lenient”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86A-12(a) (2019) (barbers; comity; “the substantive
equivalent”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-50 (2019) (electrical contractors; reciprocity; “[t]o the
extent that other states which provide for the licensing of electrical contractors provide for
similar action”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89A-4(c) (2019) (landscape architects; reciprocity &
comity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89E-11 (2019) (geologists; comity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89G-8
(2019) (irrigation contractors; reciprocity; “substantially equivalent”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-36(a)–(b) (2019) (dentists; “credentialing” with specific provision for North Carolina’s
four contiguous states); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90C-33 (2019) (recreational therapists;
reciprocity; “substantially equivalent or higher”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-202.7 (2019)
(podiatry; reciprocity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.25(b) (2019) (funeral directors, embalmers
and funeral service; comity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90D-9(a)–(b) (2019) (interpreters and
translators; reciprocity resident of N.C.; “substantially equivalent;” and out-of-state if state
recognizes N.C.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-687 (2019) (perfusionist; reciprocity); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-655 (2019) (respiratory care; reciprocity; “substantially the same”); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-531 (2019) (athletic trainers; reciprocity; if other state recognizes). This list may
not be exhaustive. Some boards, such as the Board of Funeral Service, have comity or
reciprocity but do not call it that.
205. Act of July 2, 2012, ch. 196, sec. 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 955, 956 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1).
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Following a succession of amendments over the ensuing seven years,
clarifying the process and expanding its scope, section 93B-15.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes is now entitled, “Licensure for individuals
with military training and experience; proficiency examination; licensure
by endorsement for military spouses; temporary license,” which accurately
describes its intent.206
It would be very difficult to make a valid claim that currently in North
Carolina former members of the military or the spouses of active-duty
military personnel are hindered by our occupational and professional
licensing laws.
C. Compacts
Again, mobility or portability has been a persistent complaint used to
justify abolishing licensing. However, the above-mentioned limitations of
the United States Constitution has a workaround; the “compact.” Not a true
contract between the states, but a cooperative agreement with benefits to all.
At first glance the United States Constitution appears to forbid
compacts between the states: “No State shall, without Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State . . . .”207 But “any” does not mean “all,” and the United States
Supreme Court has held consent is not required unless the compact infringes
on the federal supremacy.208 Compacts have been used to resolve boundary
disputes, to manage shared natural resources (such as water), and to create
administrative agencies which have jurisdiction over a wide variety of state
concerns including transportation (your driver’s license is subject to a
compact), taxation, education, public safety, and licensure. It is estimated

206. See Act of July 10, 2014, ch. 67, sec. 1, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 234, 234 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1); Act of July 5, 2015, ch. 143, sec. 1, 2015 N.C.
Sess. Laws 350, 350–52 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1); Act of July
1, 2015, ch. 241, sec. 24.1.(r), 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 996, 1001 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1(c1)); Act of July 1, 2015, ch. 268, sec. 7.3.(a), 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws
1299, 1310 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1); Act of June 8, 2017, ch.
28, sec. 3, 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 179, 191 (codified as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. §
93B-15.1); Act of June 30, 2017, ch. 189, sec. 6.(a), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 1306, 1328
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1(i)); Act of July 1, 2019, ch. 71, sec.
2.3, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 71 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1(i)); Act
of July 2, 2020, ch. 87, pt. 1, 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 87 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 93B-15.1).
207. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
208. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472 (1978).

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol43/iss3/6

46

Gray: In Defense of Occupational Licensing: A Legal Practitioner's Pers

2021]

IN DEFENSE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING

469

there are 215 active interstate compacts today, and on average each state is
a member of two dozen compacts.209
Beginning with the original Nurse Licensure Compact in 1998, the
utilization of licensing compacts as a means to eliminate licensing barriers
and enhance occupational license portability has grown steadily, and
continues to grow between the states and territories of the United States.
Currently the notable licensing compacts are:
 Enhanced Nurse Licensure Compact210—thirty-four states
 EMS Licensure Compact211—twenty states
 Interstate Medical Licensure Compact212—thirty-one states
 Physical Therapy Compact213—twenty-eight states
 Pyspact (psychologists)214—twelve states
In 2020, the North Carolina General Assembly approved a bill to
establish the interstate compact for the practice of audiology and speech
pathology.215 Next up for the states nationally are occupational therapists,
licensed professional counselors, and possibly physicians’ assistants.216
The strongest voice for interstate licensing compacts is the Council of
State Governments’ compact incubator the National Center for Interstate
Compacts. It describes the various compacts this way:
Occupational licensure compacts are typically operationalized by one of
two methods: mutual recognition or expedited licensure. Under a mutual
recognition model, a licensee receives a multistate license from the compact
state in which the licensee has established residence or purchases a
“privilege” from the compact. This multistate license or privilege
authorizes the licensee to practice in any of the other states that have entered

209. For a brief but succinct history of interstate compacts, see Crady deGolian, The
Evolution of Interstate Compacts, in 44 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 61, 61–64 (2012 ed. 2012).
210. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE: INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN
ACTION 6 (2019), https://licensing.csg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/OccpationalIntersta
teCompacts-InAction_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/38AT-4467].
211. Id. at 4 (2019). North Carolina is not a member of the EMS compact.
212. Id. at 8.
213. Id. at 5.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Act of July 2, 2020, ch. 87, pt. 2, 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, 5 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-15.1). Currently, six states belong to this compact. Every compact
has a threshold number before it can be viable. For the audiologists and speech pathologists,
it is ten.
216. Telephone Interview with Nahale Freeland Kalfas, Of Counsel, The Council of State
Gov’ts (Dec. 9, 2020).
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the compact insofar as the licensee maintains residence in the state in which
he or she is initially licensed. That is, under a mutual recognition approach,
licensees typically must apply for a new license when they move or
establish a principal place of business in another state. Generally, licensees
are bound to the renewal and continuing education requirements of the state
in which they reside. On the other hand, an expedited licensure approach
calls for applicants to request an individual license from each state in which
they intend to practice, but the compact makes the application process more
efficient than it otherwise would be through data centralization and
harmonized application requirements. Typically, the process begins when
applicants provide their credentials to a central entity for storage and
transfer. Administrative officials from the principal state of licensing then
determine whether an applicant qualifies for expedited licensure. If
qualified, applicants receive an expedited license in other member states.
Expeditated licensure has been described as the “check the box” approach
where individuals are licensed in one state and can choose which other
states in which they would also like to be licensed. An advantage of this
approach is that it does not require licensees who move to another compact
state to apply for a new license, provided they currently possess an
expedited licensed in the new state. However, licensees would likely still
have to change their state of principal licensure. A tradeoff with this
approach is that licensees typically will have to bear the costs of licensure
in multiple states, including renewal and continuing education
requirements.217

While many of the detractors, including the Federal Trade Commission
itself,218 have the negative policy perspectives related in the introductory
portions herein, such as reduced market participation, loss of competition,
potentially higher prices, and possible wage reduction, there appears to be
a consensus forming that compacts can alleviate some of these concerns.219
Based upon the success of interstate compacts in increasing portability and
reducing barriers, particularly for military spouses, the Department of
Defense has allocated ten million dollars to the Council of State
Governments to facilitate the development of more occupational licensing
compacts between the states.220 The utilization of interstate compacts can
217. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 210, at 3.
218. KAREN A. GOLDMAN, OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN., FTC, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: OPTIONS
TO ENHANCE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE PORTABILITY 3–5 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/options-enhance-occupational-license-portability/license_portabilit
y_policy_paper_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF23-Y6GN].
219. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-4(a) (2019).
220. New Grant Awarded: Developing Interstate Compacts for Occupational Licensure,
THE CURRENT STATE (Oct. 14, 2020), https://web.csg.org/tcs/2020/10/14/new-grantawarded-developing-interstate-compacts-for-occupational-licensure/ [https://perma.cc/8R
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also mitigate some of the believed antitrust litigation liability that will be
brought about by the United States Supreme Court’s Dental Examiners
opinion.221
It should be noted that there is a substantial difference between
compacts and the concept of “universal license recognition.”222 Universal
license recognition is like reciprocity but with no rules or constraints as to
similarity of any two states’ licensing requirements; there is no uniformity,
no connectivity, and no records or a database. It is again a solution offered
by those that do not understand the complexity and nuances of occupational
and professional licensing.
VII. WHO’S FIGHTING BACK
In the early days of the scholarly journal articles and studies being
presented, few in the licensing community took note—it was all conjecture.
Occupational and professional licensing was so entrenched in state
governments nationwide nobody seemed to believe opposition would take
root. But take root it did, and it grew. All sides took notice and joined the
chorus—Republicans, Democrats, Libertarians (with a capital “L” and a
lowercase “l”), and members of the “Tea Party” when their movement
surged. Legislation began being introduced with fervor.223

WP-5KMJ]. According to Ms. Kalfas, the NCIC of the CSG is currently developing a
teacher compact. Nursing and teachers are the two most prevalent occupations for military
spouses. However, the unintended but positive consequence of this is that it assists all
teachers. Telephone Interview with Nahale Freeland Kalfas, supra note 216.
221. For a more expansive presentation on how these compacts lessen the perceived
liability, see Greenberg et al., Multistate Occupational Licensing to Protect the Public While
Minimizing Licensing Burdens, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS (Sept. 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/administrative_law/2019-meetings/1
1/06-multistate-occupational-licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUF5-BY9H].
222. A universal license recognition act was introduced in the 2020 Session of the North
Carolina General Assembly as Senate Bill 773. It was referred to the Senate Rules
Committee where it died. See S.B. 773, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019).
223. North Carolina’s experience exemplifies that of the other states. The first attempt
at “reform” in our state was in 2010, when then Governor Bev Perdue, by Executive Order
sought to eliminate “unnecessary” boards and commissions, as well as administrative rules.
While dormant boards and commissions were abolished, occupational and professional
licensing boards were unscathed. Next was the “Joint Regulatory Reform Committee,”
created by the legislature (S.L. 2011-17), that included town hall meetings around the state
to gather feedback from the public. It, too, was focused on rules and went essentially
nowhere. Following that was a study, based on surveys, by the Program Evaluation Division
(PED) of the General Assembly to evaluate the structure, organization, and operation of the
various occupational licensing boards. Regulatory Reform Act of 2013, ch. 413, sec. 10.(a),
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1752, 1759 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93B-1). The
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A. The voices on a national level
Individually, boards began pushing back, as did the various
associations representing the particular licensed profession. Uncoordinated
efforts were made to educate legislators and other elected officials on the
positive benefits of licensing, but usually only for the particular occupation,
profession or vocation. Any major changes, at least in North Carolina, were
staved off. National groups or associations of state licensing boards such
as the Federation of Associations of Regulatory Boards (FARB) based in
Schaumburg, IL, and the Council of Licensure, Enforcement and
Regulation (CLEAR) based in Nicholasville, KY, began educating its
members and sounding the alarm. The anti-regulatory movement was
gaining traction. Aside from these two groups there was no one combating
the misinformation nationally until recently.
B. Alliance for Responsible Professional Licensing
In July 2019, the American Institute for Certificated Public
Accountants (AICPA); the National Council of Architectural Boards
(NCARB), a national resource association for state licensing boards for
architects; the Council of Landscape Architectural Boards (CLARB), a
national resource association for state licensing boards for landscape
architects; and the similar associations for engineering and for surveying
teamed up to create the Alliance for Responsible Professional Licensing
(ARPL).224 ARPL began making the voice of the advanced professional
heard. Its goal is to inject into the public discourse the licensing perspective
PED’s report, entitled, “Occupational Licensing Agencies Should Not be Centralized, but
Stronger Oversight is Needed,” was released on December 17, 2014. GEN. ASSEMBLY
PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE
CENTRALIZED, BUT STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, Gen. Assemb. 2014–15, 151st Sess.
(N.C. 2014). That got everyone’s attention and made O.L.B.s begin to look inward and rally
to begin formulating a unified response. Then, Governor Pat McCrory’s economic
development group, the North Carolina Government Efficiency and Reform (NC GEAR)
initiative, made its report to the legislature’s Joint Legislative Committee on Government
Operations on March 5, 2015, which among other recommendations recommended outright
elimination of five O.L.B.s and studying the remainder. N.C. GOV’T EFFICIENCY & REFORM,
REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT Operations, Gen. Assemb.
2015–16, 152d Sess., at 40 (N.C. 2015). Then came yet another, the PED’s study in
conjunction with the State Auditor’s Office and the Office of State Controller, on improving
financial and performance reporting for oversight of boards presented in May 2018.
224. See ALL. FOR RESP. PRO. LICENSING, https://www.responsiblelicensing.org
[https://perma.cc/25BA-Q74N]. Occupational Licensing Boards Oversight Reporitng Work
Group: Improving Financial and Performance Reporting for Oversight of Occupational
Licensing Boards: Presentation to the Joint Legis. Admin. Proc. Oversight Comm., 2018
Leg. (N.C. May 1, 2018) (presentation by John Turcotte, Dir. Program Evaluation Div.).
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and ensure professional licensing is present at the forums where the issue is
being discussed and to provide research, messaging, tools and materials to
individual state organizations to complement their individual activities to
effectively communicate the importance of professional licensing. 225
FARB is now working with with ARPL.226 Another group, although not a
formal legal entity but calling itself the “Professional Licensing Coalition,”
has formed solely to address the potential antitrust liability brought about
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Dental Examiners. ARPL and this
Coalition share common membership.
As recently as October 2020, the member organizations of that
Coalition wrote Congress in support of federal legislation to alleviate the
threat of federal and private actors seeking to enjoin licensing boards on the
grounds of anti-competitive behavior.227
In 2020 alone, over 250 bills were introduced nationwide that had
some type of impact on licensing.228 Many passed, but many more did not.
And a few were like House Bill 1193 in Florida, less of a “deregulation”
bill than a “modification” bill.229 That bill passed and was signed by
Governor Rick DeSantis on June 30, 2020.230 Individually, national
organizations have been monitoring these bills for a number of years, and
ARPL has begun doing so collectively.231
225. Id.
226. FARB is also involved in the national licensing compact efforts to confront the
mobility/portability/migration shortcomings of state licensing.
227. Occupational Licensing Board Antitrust Damages Relief Act of 2020, H.R. 8680,
116th Cong. (2020). H.R. 8680 was introduced in the 116th Congress by Representative
Mike Conaway (R., 11th Dist., TX), Jamie Raskin (D., 8th Dist., MD) and David Cicilline
(R., 1st Dist., RI). It was to be reintroduced when the 117th Congress convened in February
2021. This is not the first time Congress has tried to step in to aid the various states in the
legitimate attempt to exercise their police power to regulate occupations and professions to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare since Dental Examiners. Previous attempts at
legislation include H.R. 3466 in the 115th Congress in 2017, Restoring Board Immunity Act
of 2017, H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. (2017), and H.R. 6515 in the 115th Congress in 2018,
Occupational Licensing Board Antitrust Damages Relief Act of 2018, H.R. 6515, 115th
Cong. (2018).
228. See Zach Herman, The National Occupational Licensing Database, NAT’L CONF. OF
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/occupational-licensing-statute-database.aspx [https://perma.cc/63UA-NXTH]
(scroll to “Database”; then click image to access database).
229. H.B. 1193, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020).
230. Id.
231. ALL. FOR RESP. PRO. LICENSING, supra note 224. Individual associations conducting
nationwide legislative tracking include the National Association of State Boards of
Accountancy, NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE BDS. OF ACCT., http://www.nasba.org
[https://perma.cc/6NRZ-UEJW], and the Council of Landscape Architectural Registration
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If other states are experiencing the same as North Carolina, when these
bills reach a hearing stage in the committee process, legislators begin to
understand the pitfalls to be found in deregulating, or even the lessening of
regulation with a lower form of regulation such as certification or
registration. This may be borne out in the results of a study conducted by
ARPL in 2019 and released in 2020.232 ARPL engaged Benenson Strategy
Group (BSG) to conduct a national study to understand public opinion
regarding professional licensing.233 BSG conducted interviews of over 900
“likely voters”—”individuals who are registered to vote and had voted in
the 2016 or 2018 elections or indicated that they were likely to vote in the
2020 election.”234 “This was a national opinion study with a diverse
respondent pool—mix of gender, age, race, and political ideology.”235
Research was conducted for roughly two weeks between October and
November of 2019.236
The study found that the public overwhelmingly supported licensing
regulations for “complex, highly technical professions that have a direct
impact on public health, safety, and welfare.”237 The results of the study
indicated that 75% of voters believed it was important to ensure
qualifications for certain professionals.238 “And a majority of voters believe
current professional licensing requirements protect the public and should
not be reformed.”239 However, the study also concluded that public was not
entirely opposed to deregulating licensing standards for non-professional
vocations, for instance the trades.240 “Members of the public acknowledge
that such reform initiatives may be warranted in some instances, but they
are largely opposed to legislation that is not narrowly tailored to those
ends.”241 These members of the public are also “deeply concerned by
overbroad licensing reform that would jeopardize licensing standards for

Boards, COUNCIL OF LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURAL REGISTRATION BDS., http://www.clarb.org
[https://perma.cc/MCR5-Z2RQ].
232. ALL. FOR RESP. PRO. LICENSING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: EXPLORING PUBLIC OPINION
OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING (2020), http://www.responsiblelicensing.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2020/01/ARPL-Public-Opinion-Research-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR
77-85PA].
233. Id. at 1.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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highly complex, technical professions.”242 In other words, the public
expects professions handling their physical and financial wellbeing to be
regulated.243 “More than 70% of voters believe that regulating professionals
in accounting, engineering, architecture, and related fields with high impact
on public safety and welfare is important.”244
Moreover, licensing standards are the public’s preferred default position.
71% of voters believe professional licensing should be required unless it
can be proven that eliminating licensing will not have a negative impact on
public health and safety. The public is wary of the alternative approach:
requiring licensing only when it is proven necessary for health and safety.
Professional licensing boards are also viewed favorably and are seen as
critical regulatory entities. 67% of voters believe that consumers are best
protected by a system that regulates education, examination, and experience
standards—all of which are overseen by a professional licensing board.
And the public intuitively understands what roles the boards play and why
those roles are important.245

According to this poll, “a majority of the public believes that it is ‘very
important’ that the boards oversee qualifications to enter a profession and
regulate continuing education and certification standards.”246 All of the
licensing naysayers may be correct with their various economic theories and
claims of antitrust violations, but if truth be known the American public
may just want their government to protect them regardless.
CONCLUSION
If you read or listen to the echo chamber of the same studies being
regurgitated, repackaged, and repeated again and again, that do no deep
analysis of studies littered with words and phrases such as “may,” “could
potentially,” and “tend to,” and that disregard hard facts that the regulation
of occupations and professions does not actually do any of the things
alleged, it is easy to conclude occupational licensing boards are bad—bad
for the economy; bad for the working person; bad for people who want or
need to move to another state for whatever reason.
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But what has been missing is the “other voice.” The factual voice of
reason and practicality to interrupt the reverberations of the echo. The voice
of those who “do,” not those who speculate. Board members, legal
practitioners, even the regulated (i.e., licensees). Those who know firsthand
that the conduct of these boards is not guild-like; they are not monopolistic;
they are not restraining trade, creating rents, suppressing wages, or any of
the other negative things leveled against them. They are public-spirited
persons, interested in their chosen vocation, who are making a good faith
attempt to protect the public health, safety, and welfare according to the
dictates of the popularly elected members of their state legislature.
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